EPISODE FIVE

 At the end of October 1972, General Ahmad ‘Isma`iyl  `Aliy  was appointed Minister of War in succession to General Sadiq I knew ‘Isma`iyl `Aliy's general views about war from  a report he had prepared at the start of the year in his previous job as head of the National Intelligence Service.

It was a political and strategic estimate of the situation in the Middle East, drafted for the President but given limited distribution at the most senior levels. ‘Isma`iyl  had concluded that Egypt was not ready for war. He warned that any attack mounted or led by Egypt under present conditions might lead to disaster. When I went to see the new Minister of War, therefore, to brief him on our plans and their genesis, I reminded him of what he had written.  "There have been no important changes in the armed forces since your report," I said, "especially in the air force and the mobile air defense system" But I added: "Even so, I do believe we can launch an attack with a limited objective." When I showed him the two plans Granite Two and The High Minarets-and gave him my analysis of both, ‘Isma`iyl agreed. Granite Two was impossible on present resources. We should carry on with The High Minarets.  The spring of 1973, six months away, assigned as a possible date for attack.

At this point, if final details were to be settled the plan now had to be discussed among a wider circle of officers. At these discussions, I noted, one question predominated. "When and how do we expect the enemy to counterattack?" The question went to the heart of our planning. The nature and speed of the enemy's counterattacks would depend on two factors: how long he had to prepare; and what sort of target we presented to him.

In our strategic exercises since 1968, the years of that initial and unreal plan, Granite, we had assumed counterattacks within 15-30 minutes of our crossing by sub-units ranging from tank platoons to a reinforced tank battalion. Enemy troops on the Bar-Lev line and their forward armor stationed no more than five miles behind it would organize those. Within two hours, the remainder of the enemy's three armored brigades attached to the Bar-Lev line-but based 10-20 miles behind it-would probably be in action. Against even those, however, our assault forces should be large enough to cope. But the main force the enemy had allocated to the defense of Sinai, another four armored brigades plus four mostly mechanized infantry brigades, would obviously take time to deploy across Sinai from bases in the east. The crucial question was how long? Granite had assumed we would have 36-48 hours before concerted counter-attack by those forces. Would we?

That would depend on what warning the enemy had and our estimates of that had steadily risen. First our operations department estimated that our deception plan might conceal preparations long enough to prevent alerting the enemy far in advance. But Israel would certainly be alerted, they said, three days beforehand. Given that, the department believed, Israel could mount a major counter-attack only 24 hours after our assault. Then came the still gloomier prophecies of our Defense Intelligence Department (DID). DID estimated that the enemy would fathom our intention a full 15 days before the attack, giving ample time to mobilize forces and deploy no fewer than 18 brigades in Sinai before our assault. Based on that calamitous reading, the main counterattack could come between H + 6 hours and H + 8 hours. (H-Hour is the time of assault, H + 6 is six hours after the assault starts.) Bluntly, the Director of DID was guarding his rear. If anything went wrong, he was not going to carry the can. Still, DID's view represented what technicians call the downside risk. It had to be faced.

As it stood, our plan envisaged the first waves of infantry crossing in rubber dinghies with portable weapons only. Ferries would start about H+5 hours and b ridges about H + 7 to H + 9 hours. Given their capacity, we could calculate how long it would take our tanks and heavy equipment to reach front-line infantry sub-units in any quantity. The conclusion was that bridgehead divisions could not look to armored support against enemy counter-attacks before H + 10 hours at best, probably H + 12 hours. On the DID's timings, we faced four to six critical hours. Somehow we had to cover the gap. We managed it:

ONE: We increased the supply of portable anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW) to the spearhead infantry. We or formations not directly involved in the initial crossing of their organic anti-tank guided weapons in order to rein force our spearhead infantry. It was a risk. But it was the only way to give our spearhead the capacity to repel armor. (And we assumed that these extra anti-tank guided weapons would be returned to their mother-units as soon  as our tanks had made the crossing.)

TWO: We decided to step up the activities we planned in the enemy's rear, to delay to the last minute the arrival of counter-attacking forces.

THREE:We cut back the planned advance of the infantry assault groups. Now, they would be ordered to entrench approximately three miles east of the canal, with both flanks securely lodged against its bank. There they would await heavy support weapons before further advance. By pulling back each bridgehead, shortening its perimeter, we could concentrate our defensive fire, raise the density of ATGWs along each mile of front and increase our chances of repelling counter-attacks. These new, confined bridgeheads could also be given supporting artillery and anti-tank fire from our own west bank of the canal. Moreover, the infantry would also be well under our SAM umbrella. (The point being that our SAMs would remain west of the canal, out of range of the enemy's field artillery, until that had been destroyed or driven back. Initially, until the SAMs could be moved ponderously  forward, the depth of the SAM Umbrella east of the canal would be very limited.) The concept we never questioned, even in that reappraisal, was the plan to cross the canal on the widest possible front. That had been basic to our thinking even in 1968.

First, an assault on a small concentrated front would provide an ideal target for enemy air strikes as our forces marshaled before the crossing and during the crossing itself.

Second, our infantry divisions were currently in defense west of the canal, each responsible for a sector of the waterway. Launching them into attack within those same sectors would simplify things. Our assault forces could stay in their defensive positions until the last moment. The defense works in each sector-trenches, shelters, dug-outs, and so on, could be concentration points for the assault. (To construct new sites might alert the enemy.) We could minimize the movements of the assault forces, cutting the risk of attracting a pre-emptive strike.

Third, if the enemy subsequently chose to counterattack along the whole front, their effort would be diluted. Our tanks, anti-tank guns and ATGWs would stand a better chance of repelling them. Our SAMs would perform better against a lower density of aircraft. The enemy would, in those circumstances, stand little chance of destroying a single division bridgehead.

And fourth, if on the other hand, the enemy chose to concentrate on particular sectors, one or two bridgeheads might successfully be destroyed. But from our three or more surviving ones we could restore those temporarily crushed.

Our changes to accommodate the DID's gloom about the speed of counter-attacks were, it proved, the last significant alternations of our plan. As we went into action, this was the plan of attack:

ONE: Five infantry divisions, each reinforced with an armored brigade-plus extra sub-units of ATGWs and portable SAMs drawn from other formations-to storm the Suez Canal along five sectors each three miles wide.

TWO:Objective: to destroy the Bar-Lev line piecemeal and to repel enemy Counter-attacks.

THREE: These divisional bridgeheads to penetrate to a depth of about five miles by H + 18 to H + 24 hours, each bridgehead then being about eight miles wide.

FOUR: By H + 48 hours, the divisions to have closed the gaps between their five bridgeheads to form two army-strength bridgeheads. By H + 72 hours, these two Army bridgeheads to have joined into one armed forces bridgehead penetrating six to nine miles east of the canal.

FIVE: Troops to dig in and assume the defense of these new positions.

SIX: Airborne and sea borne units to be used on a large scale to neutralize enemy HQs and to delay the approach of their reserves.

It was approaching April 1973 when General ‘Isma`iyl  `Aliy told me he wanted me, after all, to develop our plans for assault to the passes-in effect, to revive Granite TWO. Once again, in yet more long discussions, I went through the obstacles. ‘Isma`iyl  could not fault my analysis. Finally he confessed the truth. It was a political instruction. President Sadat was in contact with the Syrian government. It was clear that if the Syrians realized that our plan was limited to the capturing of a line less than ten miles east of the canal, they would not go to war alongside us. My answer was that militarily I would prefer us to go it alone this time. Our success would encourage the Syrians to join us in the later rounds. ‘Ismaa`iyl rejected that course. It had been decided that an alliance with Syria was a political necessity. I reiterated the present military impossibility of Granite Two.

Finally, ‘Isma`iyl proposed a solution. He told me to prepare, separate from the crossing plan, another plan for the development of our attack towards the passes. Details of this, he said, would serve to satisfy the Syrians. But he promised that it would never be implemented except under the most favorable conditions. "Suppose," ‘Isma`iyl  said, "the enemy suffered heavy losses to his airforce during our crossing. Suppose he decided in consequence to withdraw his forces from Sinai. Should we say stay where we are because we have no plan?"

I was sickened by the duplicity. But I was bound to obey-and to keep the secret. Even in this memoir, I have been reluctant to divulge it; but the facts, however shaming, must be told. Nations, like people, learn by their errors. So, under orders, we prepared and disseminated a plan for the passes: an updated Granite But to our own forces, at least, we did not conceal the truth. The service and army commanders were all warned that the two phases-the crossing and the drive the passes-were wholly independent. When they in turn instructed their officers, they were to speak in tail of the crossing plan but only in the broadest terms developing the attack to the east. The truth was that either I nor any of my subordinates dreamed the second phase would be carried out. Our phraseology that clear. "After an operational pause," we would

"we will develop our attack to the passes" military shorthand for saying that we would have to reconsider situation before taking the second step.

But how could we ensure this? It worried‘Isma`iyl  too; but then he worried about everything. "We are going to war, he remarked gloomily one day in September 1973. "If everything goes well, nobody will spare us any of the credit. If anything goes wrong, the search will be on for scapegoats." He was so frightened our plan might not work that I tried to comfort him with my own conviction it would. "That's all very well," ‘Isma`iyl replied, "but it would be better if the President issued a directive assigning us a clear cut mission, one within the actual capabilities of our armed forces. With that, we could not be faced with new missions we might be unfit for:'

‘Isma`iyl had been sacked twice by President Nasir and the scars went deep. Before taking any step, his first thought was how to guard his flanks and rear. He insisted on everything in writing, not just from superiors but from his subordinates as well. But this time I supported him: we both knew what he was talking about. "I think we will go to war whether that presidential directive is issued or not," I said. "But it would be a good idea to get one."

A couple weeks later, towards the end of September, ‘Isma`iyl  called me into his office. He had the directive. It was pro forma except for one sentence: "The actions and operations to be carried out by the armed forces within their own capabilities." Theoretically, GHQ could now veto any mission as being beyond our capabilities I congratulated ‘Isma`iyl  on getting it. He asked me to acknowledge the directive by signing it. Without hesitation I took out my pen, wrote at the foot of the directive "'Inshaa’Allah" -we shall succeed-and signed.

The name of the operation thus set in motion was almost the last point to be settled. Something more inspirational than our planning title, The High Minarets, was obviously needed. It was in September 1973, less than a month before our assault, that October 6 was finally selected as D-Day In the Islamic calendar, that would be the tenth day of the month of Ramadan in the year 1393: During the month of RamaDaan in the Christian year 624, the forces of the Prophet Muhammad won their first victory at the Battle of Badr. Operation Badr named itself.
 
 

        The total strength of the Egyptian Army. deployed along the western bank of the Suez
Canal were five infantry divisions and a number of independent brigades - infantry and armor backed by three mechanized divisions and two armored divisions. Each infantry division included a battalion of tanks for every one of the three brigades, for a total of 120 tanks in every infantry division. The three mechanized divisions included two mechanized  brigades and one armored brigade, for a total of 160 tanks per division. The two armored divisions were composed of two armored brigades and one mechanized brigade, for a total of about 250 tanks per division. In addition there were independent tank brigades, two parachute brigades, some twenty-eight battalions of commandos and a marine brigade.
 
 
 

 The Second Army was responsible for the northern half of the Canal and the Third Army for the southern, the Second Army front being held by the 18th Infantry Division from Port Said to al-Qantarah and the Firdan Bridge, by the 2nd Infantry Division from the Firdan Bridge to north of Lake al-Timsah, and by the 16th Infantry Division from Lake al-Timsah to Deversoir at the northern end of the Great Bitter Lake. The dividing line between the two armies ran through the center of the Great Bitter Lake.

The Third Army had under command the 7th Infantry Division, responsible for the sector of the Bitter Lakes to half-way down the southernmost section of the Suez Canal, and the 19th infantry Division south to and including the city of Suez. Each of the assaulting infantry divisions was reinforced for the crossing by an armored brigade drawn in part from the armored and mechanized divisions.
 
 
 

The combat element of the Egyptian army was formed into three armored, three mechanized and five infantry divisions, all on the triangular Soviet pattern, that is, three companies to a battalion, three battalions to a regiment, and three regiments to a division, plus integral supporting and logistic units. In addition there were two paratroop and sixteen artillery brigades, and twenty ranger units. The Soviet Union had replaced the weapons lost in the June 1967 war, and during the War of Attrition further quantities of munitions had been sent, including SAMs and their supporting equipment. According to General al-Shazliy Egypt possessed, on the eve of the October War, the following:

These deployed about 1,700tanks; 2,500 armored vehicles; 2,000 artillery pieces; 1,500 anti-tank guns; 700 anti-tank guided weapons; several thousand RPG-7(Rocket Propelled Grenades) portable anti-tank projectiles; and many more thousands of RPG-43 anti-tank grenades.