The
glow that the October agreement had brought to our relations with the Soviet
Union soon faded. The October agreement stipulated that arms were to be
delivered by the end of the year. They were, but not with enough time for
us to train our pilots and navigators; therefore, as 1971 closed, our capabilities
were not increased at all. (Specifically, we needed at least three months
to train our MIG-17 pilots to fly MIG-21s, and 9-12 months
to train flight teams for the TU-16s, mainly navigators.) It became
increasingly clear that the Soviets were not in favor of our launching
an offensive before the end of the "year of decision," as President Sadat
persisted in announcing daily. It is interesting to note that to save face
after all the propaganda surrounding the "year of decision," Sadat
tried to claim that the arms had actually not been delivered. December
20, 1971: Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov met
with Sadat . Sadat
told us later the Ambassador informed him that Soviet reconnaissance had
detected growing Israeli troop concentrations in Sinai. The Soviets
had also learned, he said, that Israel had fresh guarantees of United States'
support in the event of a resumption of fighting. It was also very probable
that Israel would attack more than one Arab country simultaneously.
December 25: Grechko
in Cairo. A 24-hour stopover on his way back to Moscow from Mogadishu,
so it was not an official visit. But it came just after the Indo-Pakistan
War (which had ended with the secession of east Pakistan under the name
Bangladesh) so no doubt it served some purpose in the game of nations.
Or perhaps, having heard from the Soviet advisers of our discontent,
Grechko wished to check things out for himself. He was in fine
form; I had never seen him so jovial as at the dinner in his honor that
evening at the Soviet Embassy. "Just imagine," he boomed with heavy
emphasis, "only yesterday my group and I took a dip in the Indian Ocean."
His statement did not go unnoticed. It was a clear message to the effect
that the Soviet Union is ready, willing and able to come to the aid of
its friends.
January 2, 1972: By the New Year, Sadiq's
criticisms of the Soviet Union were becoming more strident and more public.
The President summoned the Armed Forces Supreme Council, I assumed to find
out how many shared Sadiq's
views. My notes summarize his account of the political situation:
The Americans are giving Israel complete support; while the Soviets
have not yet supplied us with what they promised last October. Nor did
the deal concluded December 20, 1971: Soviet Ambassador
Vinogradov met with Sadat
.
Sadat
told us later the Ambassador informed him that Soviet reconnaissance had
detected growing Israeli troop concentrations in Sinai. The Soviets
had also learned, he said, that Israel had fresh guarantees of United States'
support in the event of a resumption of fighting. It was also very probable
that Israel would attack more than one Arab country simultaneously.
-The Americans are giving Israel complete
support; while the Soviets have not yet supplied us with what they promised
last October. Nor did the deal concluded by General Hasan
include all the weapons Sadathad
been promised.
-The Americans are not going to exert pressure
on Israel. They now call their role that of "catalyst."
-1971 was to have been our "year
of decision;" but the Soviet failure to supply arms and the
outbreak of war between India and Pakistan had forced the President
to reconsider. Sadat
then asked for our assessment of the military position:
FAHMIY (AIR DEFENSE):
"My problem is that I am being asked to prepare an offensive battle with
defensive weapons."
FAHMIY (NAVY): "We must put pressure on
the Soviets to force them to send us those supplies. We could partially
or completely close our ports to Soviet vessels if they do not respond."
BAGHDADIY
(AIR FORCE):
"What I need is a deterrent aircraft [i.e., with the capacity to hit back
if Israel bombed Egypt's interior]. A fighter-bomber, about Mach Two, with
a good payload and the range to reach the enemy's interior.
GENERAL `ALIY `ABD AL- KHABIYR(CENTRAL
DISTRICT): "The deficiencies in
our armed forces make a successful offensive impossible. The main weakness
lies in our air force, our lack of transport and communications equipment
and our inability to find a way of opening passages fast enough through
minefields."
GENERAL SA`IYD AL-MAHIY(ARTILLERY):
"We must do something within our capabilities."
MYSELF (AL-SHAZLIY): "Despite all
their deficiencies, our armed forces can mount a limited offensive. The
President should contact
the Soviets and settle with them the broad issues that will affect our
planning. For instance, the Soviets have considerable forces in Egypt:
two fighter brigades, an air defense division and several electronic warfare
units. We must know what the position of these will be in the event of
our launching an assault, especially the role of those electronics units
whose task would be to support the offensive."
SADIQ,
(SUMMING UP): "We are all ready to fight. But we must not decide on war
unless victory is guaranteed. The country could not take another defeat.
Our forces have many deficiencies. These we must remedy before going into
battle. For my part, I will try to remedy some of the defects through purchases
from the Western bloc. I will report to you, Mr. President, as soon as
I have accomplished that." (See Appendix: Notes
to Sadat's
Conferences attached below.)
January
24: An address by Sadiq
to several thousand officers of all ranks. The Soviets, he told
them, had not supplied the weapons and equipment we needed. They were deliberately
blocking Egypt's offensive. Unless the President could get some
new agreement in Moscow in a visit already scheduled for early February,
we would buy the weapons anywhere in the world. He warned that the Russians
were circulating rumors that our forces already had all they needed but
the commanders were unwilling to fight. They must not listen to such lies,
Sadiq
said. It was his most outspoken attack on the Soviet Union so far.
(To be continued)
Next issue: The Gathering Reinforcements |
