March 23:
With very short notice an Iraqi delegation under Vice President Saddam
Husaynarrived
in Cairo. Their decision to come, especially with so powerful a
figure was significant. Behind the scenes, Saddam
Husayn
was the real strong man of Iraq. We hastily convened to decide our
position on the points likely to be raised. Present were Vice President
Mahmuwd
Fawziy;
National Security AdviserHafiz
Isma`iyl;
Minister of the InteriorMamduwh
Salim;
Foreign MinisterMuwrad
Ghalib;
myself;
the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs; and the Egyptian Ambassador toIraq.
Given
the rivalry between Syria and Iraq, none of us wanted to
do anything to damage relations with Syria, which was already sharing
the burden of the battle. The Ambassador was inevitably, I suppose,
keenest to advance toward cooperation and conciliation; most of the others
were suspicious of Iraqi intentions. "Whatever they
say, I don't think they want unity," one remarked. "I don't think they
will send troops to the battle either. They are up to some party maneuver,
that's all."
I urged
we try. For me, Iraq meant 250 combat aircraft, four infantry divisions,
and two armored divisions. "If we can guarantee even a part of that, it
will add a new dimension to our forces," I said. Iraq would
probably ask who would command any forces it might send to the Syrian front.
We had to make it clear they should be under Syrian command. They might
also say they would send troops only after the war began. We should oppose
this. They would never arrive in time to be useful. Finally, Iraq
might point to the weakness of Syria's air defense: would the Iraqi
Air Force be destroyed by surprise attack if it were sent to the front
before the battle? But I knew from my own discussions that Syria
was ready to let the Iraqis build what air bases they liked on Syrian soil
and install what equipment they liked to defend themselves.
The
talks went round and round. Our delegation was instructed to concentrate
on the help Iraq could offer the battle and to beware any step that
might offend Syria; the Iraqis insisted their differences with
Syria could be surmounted. The only positive outcome was Saddam
Husayn's
insistence that I visit Iraq as I had other countries, to see their
forces for myself.
To
run ahead of sequence, I finally went to Iraq at the end
of May, the first official visit by a high-ranking
Egyptian for years. (Sadat
had been reluctant to let me go. His opinion of Iraq and its President,
Ahmad
Hasan
al-Bakr, was no higher than his views
of Hasan, Boumedienne
or
Husayn.)
From
May 26 until June 2, I toured the country
from the Kurdish settlements in the north to the Shatt-al-`Arab
in the south, scene of the border dispute with Iran. I saw every
major military installation, and I met some of the thousands of Egyptian
teachers, academics and technicians in Baghdad.
I returned
to Cairo frankly thinking I had little to show for my time but conditional
promises
"The situation with the Kurds and with Iran must be quiet.
" I had a pleasant surprise a few days later. Vice Minister of Defense,
General
`Abd al-Galiylfrom
Iraqi GHQ turned up in Cairo.
Saddam
Husayn
was going to France in mid-June
and
wanted to know what equipment we needed,
so
Iraq
could buy it for us.
So
once more we had relations with Iraq, however tinged with caution.
We offered places in our staff colleges and training centers to their officers
and enlisted men. And Iraq generously put £.7 million
at our disposal in a London bank to cover urgent defense purchases in the
West. The promised squadron of Hawker Hunters began to arrive in Egypt
in March 1973.
Iraqi
squadron of Hawker Hunters arriving in Egypt, March 1973.
Egypt's
relations with Saudi Arabia were always mysterious. Even as Chief
of Staff I was allowed no part in them, but remained a distant and
frequently puzzled observer. Relations were left to the Ministers of
War, but also and to a degree one could never fathom to the President
himself or his personal courier and emissary, Dr. Ashraf
Marwan. Dealings were certainly
brisk. I suppose they made well over 30 trips in my time as Chief of Staff.
I never learned what happened at any of them.
The
strangeness of the relationship was well indicated by the Lightnings.
At the Arab Collective Defense Council, meeting in November 1971,
it had been decided we should mobilize two squadrons of Lightnings
from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Back in my office, I was told Sadiq
would
deal with this. A few weeks later Sadiq
informed me that the Saudis would not agree to sending pilots with the
aircraft. Egypt would have to supply its own. I was told to send
Egyptian pilots to train in Saudi Arabia before flying the aircraft
back to Egypt. (Now, in March, it turned out that Sadat
had told the Soviets we were doing it.) It
was nonsensical. Trained pilots, not aircraft,
were what we lacked. With 100 Soviet pilots already flying Egyptian aircraft
for us, how could we spare 10-15 of our own men for Saudi Arabia? (And
Sadat's
assertion that Lightnings could substitute for the TU-22 was equal nonsense.)
But the decision stood. On May 2,
1972 the first contingent of seven pilots and 33 mechanics set off for
Saudi Arabia.
Above:
Soviet made Tupolev Tu- 22 " Blinder"
medium range supersonic bomber.
Below:
British made BAC Lightning
single-seat interceptor fighter. The assertion that the
Tu-22
bombercould be substituted with a Lightning
fighter was utterly nonsensical.
It
was a waste of time. There were so many problems with the serviceability
of the aircraft and the standards of instruction and administration that,
after wasting almost a year, our pilots finally returned to Egypt.
The Lightnings never came.
Relations
with Saudi Arabia seemed unaffected, though. To dispose of the point:
it was in July 1973
that I had a phone call from
Marwan.
Saudi
Arabia was going to sign a contract on our behalf for Sea King helicopters
and 32 Mirages. Marwannow
said that the sum allocated for machine gun ammunition for the aircraft
was excessive $35 million, he claimed-and
had to be cut. I knew nothing about it. When I spoke to General Husniy
Mubarak, the new Air Force Commander,
he said he had not asked for any ammunition. We just looked at each other.
Two
more surprises came in that same conversation. Marwan
said that King Faysal
had decided to give a helicopter as a present to Sadat.
Would I please send pilots to fly it home. When I mentioned this to Mubarak,
he said he had already sent men to inspect it. It was an Augusta Bell
L-13 with a single motor and a landing skid. Mubarak
thought
Sadat
would reject it as too modest.
The
promised Sea King helicopters;
we
never received them.
Final
surprise: "Henceforth,"
Marwan
said, "all contacts between Egypt and Saudi Arabia will be directly
between President Sadat
and King Faysal and
not through the two defense ministers."
"Why
tell me," I asked. "Shouldn't you be telling the minister?"
"Sure," Marwan
said. "I will when he gets back from abroad. I'm just telling you for your
information."
What
was going on? I never knew. What I do know
is that we never received either the Sea King
helicopters or the Mirages which Marwan
spoke to me about.
NEXT EPISODE:
CONFRONTATION WITH SADIQ |
The
mistake is illustrated again and again in military history. One could almost
put the matter this way just as a businessman cannot take the profit from
a single transaction and put it into a separate account, so an isolated
advantage gained in war cannot be assessed separately from the overall
result. businessman must work on the basis of his total assets, and in
war the advantages and disadvantages of a single action could only be determined
by the final balance.
