April 20, 1972: My worst clash with Sadiq. The issue, unexpectedly, concerned neither the Soviets nor the conduct of the armed forces. It was a matter of constitutional propriety. 

After the Arab Collective Defense Council had unanimously approved the plan to buy two vessels to chart our inshore waters, it was my task as Assistant Secretary General of the Arab League for Defense to carry out the decision. I decided to send General `Abd al-Ra’uwf to Britain to finalize a deal. Ra’uwf was an Egyptian officer temporarily removed from his regiment to serve the Arab League as Chief of Staff of the Arab Unified Command, with the task of winding it up. Ra’uwf had today set off for London, only to be arrested by the Defense Intelligence Department on  Sadiq's direct orders at Cairo airport, treated like an escaping felon, and his passport withdrawn. It was an appalling breach of the rule that Arab League personnel have diplomatic immunity on League business. And  Sadiq himself had voted in favor of the deal Ra’uwf was flying out to arrange. His detention was a deliberate challenge by Sadiq to my independence as Assistant Secretary General of the League. 

I got back to my office from a field exercise about 2730 hours to learn the news. By 2000 hours I was in  Sadiq 's office. It was the worst encounter I have ever known between two old friends, let alone a minister and a chief of staff. But for me it was the last straw. 

We had to see the President, I said. Things could not go on like this.  "Good idea,"  Sadiq shouted, equally livid. "On Saturday I will go with you to the President and ask him to choose between us, either you or me in the armed forces." The next day was a Friday (the Arab weekend).  Sadiq, still without authority, dismissed Ra’uwf  from his post in the Arab Unified Command and sent a cable to London withdrawing the funds deposited for the contract.  April 23, 1130 hours:Sadiq and I in front of the President at his Giyzah residence. I told everything including the Ra’uwf incident and Sadiq’s efforts to bar me from areas such as the Intelligence Department and Officers Department. "Mr. President," I said, "in that situation, with those departments under the exclusive control of General  Sadiq, I cannot be answerable for the security of the armed forces" a polite usage for a coup. Recounting our disagreement over the deployment of the T- 62, I made my point. I did not care if our opinions differed. What disturbed me was that  Sadiq should clearly think my opinions were influenced by and concerted with, the Soviets listening with what objectivity I could, I thought  Sadiq’s reply was weak.

I broke in: "It's a matter of principle. To rescind the decision of a committee of 15 generals you should have a reason far stronger than your personal view. An officer's future should. not be left in the hands of one man." 

"See, Mr. President," Sadiq answered. "He is trying to deprive me of my rights."  On the T- 62 I thought  Sadiq confirmed my point, since he said sweepingly that I was always against him, always siding with the Russians. 

The President, invariably, made no decision. "Muhammad," he said to General Sadiq, "you must inform Sa`d of everything going on in the Intelligence Department and Officers Department. He does share the responsibility." 

But when he turned to me, it was clear that Sadiq had touched deeper chords. "Look Sa`d, you must be careful," Sadat said. "The Russians will deceive you. Everyone now dislikes them and, knowing that, they will try to use you. You will be the loser." "Mr. President," I repeated, "if I agree with the Russians on certain subjects, that should not be taken as evidence that I am colluding with them against anybody. I always say what I think is right for my country, no matter whose side that puts me on."

So after three hours nothing was resolved. Things ran smoothly for a few weeks, then degenerated again. Meanwhile, the inquiry Sadiq had promised into Ra’uwf proceeded to hunt for financial scandal, with  Sadiq's nominee as Ra’uwf's successor energetically lending a hand. All Ra’uwf could be accused of, in the end, was phoning a daughter in the United States from his office, buying a fountain pen with official funds, and similar trivia. 
 

I am a hardliner: I disapprove totally of any financial laxness. But I could not help contrasting Ra'uwf's "crimes" with the liberties taken by our leadership. What is one phone call compared to a permanent private telephone line to Europe? What is a fountain pen beside the use of State-owned aircraft to fly personal errands to Paris, Rome or London? Why should the usual European travel allowance be X10 sterling a day, yet some have an open account for more than X200 sterling a day? Other, more serious corruptions I shall disclose when the time is right. 

My point is that power in Egypt today, as the Ra'uwfincident demonstrated, means a license to do whatever you want, while breaking your opponents on trifling, even trumped up grounds.