June 6: A meeting of the inner circle of the Armed Forces Supreme Council, called by the President at his residence at the Barrage. Sadiq, myself, Hasan (Vice Minister), Muhammad `Aliy Fahmiy (Air Defense), Mahmuwd Fahmiy (Navy), Misiyriy (Air Force Chief of Staff, substituting for Mubarak),Mihriz (Defense Intelligence Department), Gamasiy (Operations), Khabiyr (Central District), Gawhar (Organization), Giriytliy (Secretary). Sadiq asked Gamasy to read out a report prepared by General Ahmad Isma`iyl `Aliy, Director of the National Intelligence Service, and submitted to the President. Its conclusion was that the enemy's superiority, especially in the air, was such that Egypt's Armed Forces were in no position to mount a successful assault. The President then spoke: "We must distinguish between politicians and soldiers. You as soldiers must concentrate your efforts on preparing the troops for the coming battle. I realize, and General Sadiq agrees with me, that we must not go into battle unless we have the capacity to deter Israel from attacking our interior [i.e., have an air force capable of raiding Israel in retaliation]. The problem which confronts us is what to do if we are obliged, politically, to go to war before we have that deterrent?"

I spoke next: "Nobody can doubt the facts in the report. Given its premise, its conclusions follow. For my part, I doubt the premise. If we are going to base our planning upon an adequate air force, we will have to postpone the battle for years and years. Nobody could even predict a date. In fact, I believe the gap between our air force and the enemy's will tend to widen rather than narrow, whatever we do now or in the near future. The American strategy is to sustain Israel's air superiority against all Arab front-line states combined. We are having trouble getting appropriate aircraft from the Soviet Union. Even if we did, the enemy would simply get even more advanced versions from the United States. So it would go on. On top of which, the enemy has the capacity to absorb new types of aircraft faster than we can. So they will always be able at least to maintain the present gap and probably to widen it.

Misiyriy (Air Force): "I totally agree with General Shazliy."

President (ferociously joking): "Misiyriy, I swear to God, if the air force does not acquit itself well this time I personally will hang you from one of the trees in this garden."(See Appendix: Comments on Sadat's Conferences.)

June 8-13: General Sadiq in Moscow.

June 20: Sadiq called a small meeting. Myself, plus the commanders of the Air Force, Air Defense, Navy, Field Armies Two and Three, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Department.

Before Sadiq spoke, Mihriz, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Department, mentioned a report of a Soviet journalist visiting our field units, asking fairly loaded questions: "Israel has sophisticated weapons. When we supply you with weapons to match them, you discover that Israel has even more advanced equipment, so you come back to us and ask for more. The gap between you and Israel is going to remain. It might even widen. Does that mean you will never fight? How is it that the people of Vietnam manage to fight with the same weapons, and against the Americans themselves?"

Sadiq shot me a look. "That is Sa`d al-Shazliy speaking," was all he said. (General Sa`d Ma'muwn and General `Abd al-Mun`im Wasil, Commanders of the Second and Third Armies respectively, came up afterwards to ask what Sadiq had meant. I explained the June 6 meeting.)

Reporting on his visit to the Soviet Union, Sadiq said that Grechko had told him Egypt must prepare its armed forces, its civilians and the country as a whole for a prolonged war. And Egypt must be supplied with the weapons to ensure victory. Brezhnev had then said:

ONE:The internal situation in Egypt was still not settled. Some looked to the East, some to the West.

TWO:The situation in the Middle East was complex. Israel was proposing solutions unacceptable to both of us.

THREE: The Soviet Union believe that what had been taken by force could only be regained by force. The Soviet Union would support Egypt.

FOUR:Our two countries must work together within the framework of United Nation's Resolution 242.

FIVE: To recapture one's territory one had first to create defensive forces. Then one could start to create forces of attack. But before doing so, one had to be clear whether those forces were actually going to fight.

six: The presence of Soviet advisers in Egypt was an international necessity.

SEVEN: The Soviet Union would never conclude an agreement with the United States at the expense of Egypt.

EIGHT: The liberation of Egypt's territory was Egypt's own responsibility. It was also Egypt's responsibility to help its friends in Syria.

Sadiq's impression was of a Moscow in low gear. Soviet policy had not changed. On the other hand, Moscow wanted to keep the international scene quiet for six months until after the United States presidential elections in November. If Nixon won his second term, as Moscow expects, the Soviet Union would relax and go slow on weapons supplies to us in the hope of reaching a peaceful solution in accord with Washington. Meanwhile they remained concerned about the internal situation in Egypt and the security of their position. They have even asked that the Egyptian leadership eliminate all who might be thought anti-Soviet

July 9: The Saudi Embassy. A dinner in honor of their Minister of Defense, Prince Sultan. Sadiq and Hasan were there too. In the midst of the joviality, Sadiq drew us both into a quiet corner. "The President has decided to expel the Russians," he said.

When I arrived, he told me he had decided to expel the Soviet advisers and units from Egypt; that he would announce the decision in a few days, but wanted to inform me first so I could take the necessary precautions. He told me not to tell anyone. For the past 48 hours I have been arguing with myself. Today I decided to tell you both, especially since I have realized that others here seem to know."

I was stunned: "But you must realize how dangerous this decision is," I said, "Surely we all know that. There is no question but that it will affect our capabilities. The Soviet units play such a large role in our air defense and electronic warfare."

Then I realized that even Sadiq, the Soviets' leading antagonist in Egypt, was showing no joy. On the contrary: "I know," he said. "I tried to convince the President not to do it. But I couldn't. He just said: It is final. I called you to inform you of my decision, not to discuss it.' " Sadiq was bewildered: "I always said we should exert pressure on them to get what we want. But I never thought we would go this far." Hasan was equally amazed.

I found myself reflecting on one of Brezhnev's reported comments to Sadiq in Moscow last month: "The presence of Soviet advisers in Egypt is an international necessity." In my experience, the Soviets say and do nothing without a reason. I deduced that Soviet intelligence had wind of the impending decision. My other thought was to wonder: why now? Was it an impulsive response to some new Soviet statement of position? If so, what? Or had he made the decision in principle long before, merely waiting for some opportune moment to effect it? If the latter, who inside or outside Egypt knew of the President's decision? (In his memoirs Sadat presents the decision as a swift response to a Soviet rebuff. But in the light of all that has happened in the intervening seven years, I am morally certain that the decision was in fact a calculated one, pre-arranged with others whose role Sadat is still anxious to conceal.)

July 16, afternoon: The President's decision was announced to the troops. It was to take effect the next day.
 
 

July 17: Sadiq, Okunev and myself met. Topic: repatriation of Soviet personnel. There were four categories of personnel in Egypt, some more vital to us than others. First, we had about 870 Soviet "advisers." They gave, literally, advice on tactics, training and administration. Their departure would not affect us much. Second, we had more than 100 "experts"-technicians training our people on new weapons or equipment, anything from the T- 62 to new night optical equipment. To lose them before our men were trained would gravely embarrass us. Finally we had "friendly forces"-two groups of them. One comprised of Soviet units operating weapons and equipment already purchased by Egypt and thus our own property. These forces included two fighter brigades and, still, a substantial part of an air defense division. The other group was operating equipment still wholly owned by the Soviet Union: in other words, Soviet units in manpower and weaponry. Some of this we were in process of purchasing: the QUADRAT (SAM-6) brigade, for instance. But other units had equipment the Soviets had always declined to sell to us: the four MIG-25s, the electronic warfare units and the electronic reconnaissance and jamming squadron.

Trying to abide by the President's adamant guidelines, while at the same time seeking to minimize the damage to our capabilities, Sadiq and I proposed to Okunev that we treat each category separately. Contracts of advisers and experts would be terminated forthwith. Friendly forces operating Egyptian equipment should hand it over to our men within one week. But those operating Soviet-owned equipment for which we had neither substitute equipment nor personnel should stay in Egypt, provided they now came under the control of the Egyptian command.

All Soviet personnel whose repatriation, though agreed, was delayed beyond August 1 would nevertheless cease all activity from that date.

It was a despairing effort. General Okunev was cooperative. He agreed to all terms except the crucial one that those we could not replace should stay. His orders, he said, were that everyone should go. But he promised to pass on our request and the answer. (To nobody's surprise, it was no.)

Politics apart, the logistics of the operation were taxing. Soviet personnel in Egypt totaled less than 8,000, including advisers, experts, field unit personnel and their dependents. Total Soviet field unit personnel (those operating Egyptian as well as Soviet equipment) totaled 6,014, including air force, air defense and electronic units. We offered help with transport, but Okunev said he was under strict orders to complete the operation by Soviet means only.

Over the next fortnight, problems rained on to my desk or into my telephone. Every service ringing to report new problems, ask for new instructions. "The Russians are dismantling the radars at Baniy Swayf and Biyr `Ariydah air bases. What shall we do?" "The Russians are removing tons of spare parts from the units they are handing over to us. What shall we do?" Meanwhile Okunev would be calling to report that while the Russians were crating an air force unit near Aswan, one of their most advanced air-to-air missiles, a type not in use with the Egyptian air force, had "disappeared."
 
 
 

My only rule, which I drummed into all who rang, was that the Soviets had the right to remove anything that was Soviet property. We should retain only those items specified in contracts with them. When I look back on the fact that the whole ghastly period passed without serious incident, I take a certain melancholy pride in the fact that at the top both Egyptian and Soviet commands were equally eager to resolve problems raised by hot-blooded young officers on both sides.

By the end of July, only 2,590 of the total 7,752 personnel had left by sea or air. We suspended the military college from July 2$ to August 11, turning it into a makeshift hostel for those who could not leave by the August 1 deadline. The remaining 5,162- 529 advisers and their families, and 4,633 friendly forces were repatriated through the first half of August.

Then we had to start repairing the gaps. We had lost the four MIG-25s, the SMALTA electronic equipment to jam the guidance system of the enemy's HAWK surface to-air missiles; the TAKAN equipment which could jam the radar transmissions of the enemy aircraft themselves; plus the Soviet electronic reconnaissance and jamming squadron.
 
 

August 25: The last problem was the QUADRAT batteries which, owned and manned by the Soviets, had been guarding the High Dam at Aswan. We had already signed a contract for two brigades of them, so the Soviets did not regard them as secret and they offered to hand them over to us. Lacking personnel to operate them, we had refused. In the absence of an adequate air force, however, these mobile SAMs were so central to our offensive planning that we had to reconsider the problem. So General Sadiq called a meeting-myself,Fahmiy (Air Defense) and Okunev-to review it. Sadiq told Okunev that the President now agreed the QUADRAT brigade could remain until the end of 1972, on condition that it carried out no operational mission, i.e., did nothing but train Egyptians. Okunev said he would consult Moscow.

August 29: It did not work. The commander of the Aswan military district phoned to say the Russians were pulling out their QUADRAT. Okunev confirmed the decision to me.

August 30: I was on the phone to the President and told him of the Soviet decision. "With our best wishes" was his only comment.
 
 

In war, every engagement is a bloody and destructive test of physical and moral strength. Whoever has the greater sum of both left at the end is the victor. In the engagement, the loss of morale has proved the major decisive factor. Once the outcome has been determined, the loss continues to increase, and reaches its peak only at the end of the action. This becomes the means of achieving the margin of profit in the destruction of the enemy's physical forces which is the real purpose of the engagement. Loss of order and cohesion often makes even the resistance of individual units fatal for them. The spirit of the whole is broken; nothing is left of the original obsession with triumph or disaster that made men ignore all risks; for most of them danger is no longer a challenge to their courage, but harsh punishment to be endured.us the tool is weakened and blunted at the first impact of the enemy's victory, and is no longer suitable for countering danger with danger. All in all, loss of moral equilibrium must not be underestimated merely because      it has no absolute value and does not always show up in the final balance.  It can attain such massive proportions that it overpowers everything by its irresistible force. For this reason it may in itself become a main objective of the action Carl Von Clausewitz; Prussian Military Philosopher