October 4, 1972: The Soviet authorities asked permission for three naval tank transports to berth in Port Said harbor. They had based there only two months before and, though they had been withdrawn with all other Soviet equipment, they legally had the right to return. The five-year naval facilities agreement which Nasir had signed in 1968 had neither expired nor been abrogated. But I assumed the Soviet request was really  to take the temperature before Sidqqiy  arrived in Moscow. I phoned the President, putting forward Sidqqiy 's visit as a reason why we might agree. "OK," he said. "Our agreement to grant them naval facilities is valid until March 1973. We can grant permission within the terms of that. If Sidqqiy 's trip to Moscow does not succeed, I will terminate that agreement too and ask them to leave." So the next day the inhabitants of Port Said awoke to see familiar silhouettes once more alongside the mole. 

October 12, 1845 hours: A rare evening at home. The phone rang. Lieutenant  General Shariyf, Chief Aide-de Camp to the President. A number of tanks have driven into Cairo, ignoring military police signals. There is a real threat to the President, Shariyf says, because he is going to a meeting later this evening with members of the Assembly. General Sadiq has already been told. I sped to my HQ, Only to learn that military police had already arrested the ringleader and taken him to Central District HQ. I went on there. General Sadiq had arrived a few minutes before, and in less than half-an-hour we were joined by General `Abd al-Khabiyr, Commander of the Central District. The arrested officer was identified as Captain `Aliy Husny `Iyd, commander of a mechanized company in an armored brigade stationed ten miles or so east of Cairo. 

 Sadiq questioned him, with  Khabiyr and I putting in questions from time to time. The captain's story: "My company was on alert against enemy airborne troops. I decided to train my men with a preparedness exercise. When we had finished that, about 1600 hours, I thought we might drive to Sayydna al-Husayn mosque for maghrib prayers. We left our vehicles in the square and went in to pray. When we came out we were surprised to find military police surrounding us and arresting us:" 

At least it had the merit of being unusual. But it was full of holes  which `Iyd was quite unable to bridge. Why did he have with him vehicles and men not of his own company? Why had he not told his battalion commander of his wish to exercise, so the usual security measures could have been taken? Why had he crashed through the military police point on the outskirts of Cairo, violating the standing order that no military vehicle or weapon could enter Cairo without a prior written order from GHQ? Did he, finally, regard it as normal to go to his mosque in an armored vehicle? 

The captain's followers seemed, by contrast, honestly confused. He had told them they were on an exercise. They had set off in 12 armored personnel carriers. When they reached Cairo military checkpoint, the first seven had sailed through but the police had managed to halt the last five. The captain had then led them at high speed through the streets of Cairo, radioing confused and ambiguous orders. The commanders of four of the vehicles began to have serious doubts and halted. When the captain reached the mosque  square with his fina three vehicles they had, as he said, gone inside to pray 

As his questioning proceeded, it became fairly clew Captain `Iyd was a religious maniac. He would break of his answers to recite the Qur'an, then launch into fervent denunciations of the Egyptian way of life, people forgetting their God, neglecting their religious obligations and so on. (Captain `Iyd was subsequently committed to a mental hospital.) 

A worried General Sadiq soon departed, saying he was going to report to the President. Watching him go, it seemed to me possible the President would recall my warning of April 23 that if Sadiq insisted on controlling those two key departments, I could not answer for the security of the forces. I was correct. 
 

October 16-18: To everyone's relief Sidqqiy's mission to Moscow has been a great success. The Soviet's have promised to supply one squadron of MIG-23s, but only to arrive in the last quarter of 1973; one squadron of SU-20s, to arrive at the same time; and, most important, a brigade of R-17E ground-to-ground missiles (known in the West as SCUDS), with a range of almost 150 miles. The delivery date of this will be fixed early next year. We have begun to reconstruct the crucial alliance. 

October 24: A crucial meeting of the Armed Forces Supreme Council. The President had ordered a meeting of the Armed Forces Supreme Council at his Giyzah residence at 2100 hours. General Sadiq then said he wanted a meeting of the Armed Forces Supreme Council beforehand, in his office at noon. (It was also the day of my monthly meeting of field and staff commanders; we had to break off at 1130 hours.) 

The noon meeting with Sadiq lasted an hour. Almost every commander round the table spoke briefly of the situation as he saw it, the state of his forces and in particular their difficulties and problems. Sadiq's contribution, in summary, was: "All I want is that tonight you tell the President the true situation. The President thinks I exaggerate your problems. He wants to hear the true position from you." Everyone said they would speak out. 

From about 20 30 hours we began to gather at Giyzah. Promptly at 21 00 hours, the President opened the meeting with a long address: 

"My meetings with the Soviet leadership in March 1971, October 1971 and February 1972 were at my request. My visit to Moscow in April 1972 was at the Soviets' request. On my April 1972 visit, I told the Soviet leadership the following: 

ONE: "The problem will never budge politically unless we shift it militarily. 

TWO: "It took the Soviet Union six months to prepare and equip India for its war against Pakistan. I ask you to do the same for Egypt. 1972 is an election year in the United States. While that is on, no solid agreement can be made between yourselves and the United States. Take advantage of the remaining months of 1972; supply me with what I need; and then negotiate with the new administration from a position of strength." 

THREE: "I agree with your strategy to help the reelection of Nixon. It will be more fruitful dealing with him than with some new president whose eyes are fixed on the need to retain power for another eight years." 

"In May 1972 Marshal Grechko came. He attended the demonstration of the M-500 (MIG-25) and he had with him a communiqué about his visit already drafted by the Soviet Central Committee. They wanted to negotiate with the Americans from a position of strength, so I approved the statement. But I also gave Grechko a letter to deliver to the Soviet leadership. I told them I did want the M-500. I also wanted electronic warfare equipment. I made it clear to them, too, that I would not agree to any Soviet unit staying in Egypt unless it was wholly under Egyptian authority. 

"On June 6, I received a message from Mr. Brezhnev, in which he said the situation vis-a-vis the United States remained as before. I told the Soviet Ambasador that I wanted a reply to the message I had sent via Marshal Grechko, and I repeated what I had said in it. 

"On July 6, I was told the Soviet Ambassador had a reply and wanted to meet me. I met him on July 8. But when the Ambassador read his text it was vague and never even mentioned the message I had sent to the Soviet leaders. After he had finished, I told the Ambassador: "Your message is totally rejected. My decision is to end the service of all Soviet advisers and units in Egypt, starting July 17."
"Before making that decision public, I sent [Prime Minister] `Aziyz Sidqqiy  to Moscow to explain the situation and to suggest that a joint declaration be issued covering what was happening. Moscow did not agree; they said it was a unilateral decision and therefore should be a unilateral declaration. They still thought I was bluffing, despite `Aziyz Sidqqiy 's assurances that I was not. From July 17, as all of you know, my decision was carried out. 

"On July 311 received a message from Mr. Brezhnev. I deliberately did not hasten to answer it. But on August 31 I did finally send my reply-ten points.

"The Soviets asked [Syrian] President Hafiz al -Asad to help in improving relations between us. At his instigation, I agreed to send Dr. `Aziyz Sidqqiy  to Moscow once more, and I think his visit has had two positive results. The first is that we have established relations with the Russians on a new basis: cooperation as friends, but with absolute equality and freedom of action. The seccond point is that the Soviet Union has agreed to supply us with more weapons. [The President read out the list I have already given.] 

"By deciding delivery dates the Soviet Union still holds the reins in their hands. But at least they have demonstrated by this agreement a willingness to continue normal supplies. That is very important. I told them in my last letter of August 31 that I would take October 31 as the date of decision on our future relations. So the Soviets knew, when Sidqqiy  was in Moscow, that unless they changed their attitude I would cancel the treaty of friendship between us and withdraw the facilities they enjoy in our ports, all of which would mean our relations would then deteriorate further." 
 
 
 

On the Soviet Union's general position, the President's remarks seemed self-contradictory to me:
 

Yet the President also said the Russians had told  Sidqqiy that détente would never affect their relations with Egypt and that Soviet policy was to continue to support Egypt and to supply her with weapons. 

He then turned to the alternative to war: "As for a peaceful solution to the conflict which faces us, my last proposals were very clear: