Without some sanction, Israel could spin out negotiations for 10, 15, 20 years. We would have lost everything.The main concern of America and Western Europe, the canal, would already be open. The world would forget our problem. We would have lost not just our own territory but the cause of Palestine forever." 

Finally, the President tried to draw some lessons for the future: "We must cease to rely upon outside suppliers for our arms. We must be able to manufacture our own fighter-bombers and helicopters. We must be able to manufacture small fast naval vessels and equip them with the most powerful missiles. We must produce tanks and tracked vehicles. We must produce the most up-to-date electronic equipment and in that field Britain and France are ready to cooperate with us." He then threw the meeting open for questions. 
 
 

Gamasiy (Chief of Operations): "What are the views of the Syrians and Libyans on the prospect of battle?" 

Sadat: "Hafiz al- Asad is wholly convinced that anything we do will be an improvement on our present position, whatever the sacrifices. Syria will play their part in the battle; and they agree that action on the two fronts should be coordinated from Cairo. General Sadiq is soon to go to Syria to work out the details. 

As for Libya, everything they have is being readied for battle. They have put at our disposal a squadron of Mirages; 24 self-propelled 155mm guns; 12 120mm mortars mounted on tracked vehicles and 100 armored personnel carriers." 

Wasil (Third Army): "The training and preparedness of the troops are high. But if we were to launch an attack under present circumstances, we would have to accept very high casualties. Let us not forget the enemy has a continuous sand barrier, up to 60 feet high, with concealed firing positions along the top. They can sweep any attacking force. We must at least raise the sand barrier on our side until it matches or overtops the Israeli barrier. Then we could give covering fire." 
 
 

Shazliy: (Nobody except the President,  Sadiq and myself knew of the reinforcements promised by other Arab states. I decided to remind him, diplomatically, that now might be the time to call them.) "Mr. President, are you going to make a move to mobilize all Arab resources, or will the battle be the responsibility of the Confederation of Arab Republics -Egypt, Syria, Libya-alone?" 

President: "The battle will be mainly an Egyptian one. The other Arab countries will stand by and watch at the start. Then they will find themselves in bad trouble with their own public opinion and their attitude will change." (I decided not to press the point, but to raise it privately later.) 

Sadiq: "We must remember that the enemy can strike our interior. We must also bear in mind that Israel, with the blessing of the Americans and perhaps of others I do not want to identify, might attack us at any time. They are all in favor of destroying Egypt and its armed forces, which now constitute a very considerable threat to Israel." 

President: "I absolutely agree. The most suitable time for an Israeli strike would be just before November 7 this year [ the date of the presidential elections in the United States]. Then, with a new administration, the world would forget about the aggression and start talking about a new cease-fire."

Khabiyr (Central District): So far as I can see, the armed forces have received nothing from the Russians which adds to their effective power. On the contrary, if we consider normal consumption and wear and tear, it is possible to argue that our capabilities are actually decreasing rather than increasing. In particular, our air force remains unchanged, with all the defects it has had for years. Isn't that an important factor to weigh before we decide on war, particularly one with the casualties we expect?" 

President: "You clearly did not follow my earlier analysis. If I accepted any of that, I could never have made the decision of July 8 [to expel the Russians]. The issue facing us now is `to be or not to be.' We cannot simply load blame onto the Russians. They have armed and equipped two entire field armies-with arms and equipment of their own choosing, certainly, but equipped nevertheless."

Khabiyr (returning to the attack): "If we resolve `to be or not to be' we surely have to mobilize everything in order `to be.' If we are to go to war, we need to mobilize everything in the country for the war effort, as they do in other countries going to war." 

President:: "The mobilization of the country is my responsibility not yours. Many people in this country even still doubt there is going to be a war. If we stay as we are, the internal front will deteriorate. We must accept the calculated risk." 

Khabiyr: "Calculated risk? Why? Why not avoid the risk entirely?" 

Nawal Sa`iyd (Quartermaster General): "Is the object the liberation of the occupied territories or is it merely a resumption of military activities so as to give you a better chance of a political solution?" 

President: "I told the minister in August: Breaking the cease-fire." 

President, angrily addressing Hasan by his first name: `Abd al- Qadir, you don't have to tell me what to do and what not to do. I am responsible for this country's independence and I know what my duties are. You must not interfere in something  which is not your responsibility. I do not want to have to tell you again.Keep to your limits. You are a soldier, not a politician." 

Fahmiy (Navy), trying to calm the row: "Everyone believes the problem cannot be solved peacefully, and sort of battle, or when, or differing views, it is aimed solely at the preservation and protection of the country's interests." 

President, rounding on him: "Are you still trying to defend `Abd al- Qadir?Everyone can speak only within his limits. Everyone has authority for his particular responsibility, nothing more. I don't want to see anyone telling me what my job is or how to do it." 

The situation was tense and there was a long silence before, more calmly, the President summed up the meeting: "We are confronted with a challenge. `To be or not to be.' A partial solution has been presented to me [the U.S. peace proposals] and is still waiting for my approval. But I am not going to accept it. Other people might perhaps accept a partial solution, but I will never accept it. We will simply have to use our talents and our planning to compensate for our lack of some kinds of equipment. God bless you." 

He left the conference room. We packed our briefcases and made our way to the waiting cars. It was after midnight. 

October 26, midday: The President's secretary on the line. The President wanted to see me at 1530 hours at Giyzah. 

Sadat did not waste words when I arrived. He had decided to dismiss General Sadiq. I was to be totally responsible for the armed forces and their security from that moment-he glanced at his watch. I asked if Sadiq knew this. Sadat said not yet. I asked whether he was going to tell Sadiq, or wanted me to do it. Then Sadat said he would send his secretary to Sadiq with the news in two hours, to give me time for the necessary security precautions. 

Sadat rounded on me: "How can you say that? Didn't you hear what they said at the conference? I too used to think General Wasil was a good soldier, a sound  man. But look what he said." 

"Mr. President," I replied, "as a field commander General Wasil was only expressing his worry about the expected level of our casualties. That is his right. And what he said about the enemy's sand barrier is correct. We do have to take it into consideration. He is still a good man and a good soldier and I ask your Excellency to give him a chance to prove it. As for General Fahmiy, he is one of the most effective naval officers we have. His dismissal would be a great loss. 

"As an army man you may know General Wasil," the President said. "But I know Fahmiy. He is a man who likes praise too much, just like Sadiq. Sadiq discovered Fahmiy's thirst for praise, and Fahmiy discovered the same in Sadiq. They showered each other with compliments and in the end they have both come to believe them. I know these men better than you do." 

There was a pause. "Now," the President said briskly, "let us consider who is to be the new Minister of War." I stayed silent, and after a few seconds Sadat spoke again. I'm considering Ahmad 'Isma`iyl," he said. 

I was appalled. "Mr. President," I broke in, "I have a history of disagreement with Ahmad  'Isma`iyl going back more than 12 years, ever since we met in the Congo (now the Republic of Zaire). We have had bad relations ever since. It would be impossible for us to work together in harmony." 

I rapidly came to the conclusion that his mind was made up. I could accept or resign. As we talked-our meeting lasted an hour-I had to make up my mind. I decided to stay. We were preparing a battle of destiny. For almost 18 months I had slogged as Chief of Staff and now the worst of my job, at least, was over. It would have been too much to leave the armed forces and the fruits of my labor to others. Besides, I said to myself, perhaps Sadat's assurances will be fulfilled. (As I shall relate, I had once had similar assurances about 'Isma`iyl  from President Nasir.) If they did not, and things became impossible, I could still resign. But the most persuasive reason was that, if I resigned now, it would be seen as support for General Sadiq. It would be assumed I shared Sadiq's view that we could not start a war now or in the near future. 

I went back to my office to set in motion the usual precautions. At 2230 hours, General Ahmad 'Isma`iyl  phoned. The President had just received him and appointed him Minister of War. And the President had decided,  'Isma`iyl said, to dismiss General Fahmiy as Naval Commander and replace him with General Zikriy.
 
 

To someone who has never experienced danger, the idea is attractive rather than alarming. You charge the enemy, ignoring bullets and casualties, in a surge of excitement. Blindly you hurl yourself toward icy death, not knowing whether you or anyone else will escape him. Before you lies that golden prize, victory, the fruit that quenches the thirst of ambition. Can that be so difficult? No, and it will seem even less difficult than it is. But such moments are rare; and even they are not, as is commonly thought, brief like a heartbeat, but come rather like a medicine, in recurring doses, the taste diluted by time. Let us accompany a novice to the battlefield. As we approach the rumble of guns grows louder and alternates with the whir of cannonballs, which begin to attract his attention. Shots begin to strike close around us. We hurry up the slope where the commanding general is stationed with his large staff. Here cannonballs and bursting shells are frequent, and life begins to seem more serious than the young man had imagined. Suddenly someone you know is wounded; then a shell falls among the staff. You notice that some of the officers act a little oddly; you yourself are not as steady and collected as you were: even the bravest can become slightly distracted. Now we enter the battle raging before us, still almost like a spectacle, and join the nearest divisional commander. Shot is falling like hail, and the thunder of our own guns adds to the din. Forward to the brigadier, a soldier of acknowledged bravery, but he is careful to take cover behind a rise, a house or a clump of trees. A noise is heard that is a certain indication of increasing danger-the rattling of grapeshot on roofs and on the ground. Cannonballs tear past, whizzing in all directions, and bullets begin to whistle around us. A little further we reach the firing line, where the infantry endures the hammering for hours with incredible steadfastness.  The air is filled with hissing bullets that sound    like a sharp crack if they pass close to one's head. For a final shock, the sight of men being killed and mutilated moves our pounding hearts to awe and pity. The novice cannot pass through these layers of increasing intensity of danger without sensing that here ideas are governed by other factors, that the light of reason is refracted in a manner quite different from that which is normal in academic speculation. It is an exceptional man who keeps his powers of quick decision intact if he has never been through this experience before. It is true that (with habit) as we become accustomed to it the impression soon wears off, and in half-an-hour we hardly notice our surroundings any more; yet the ordinary man can never achieve a state of per-fect unconcern in which his mind can work with normal flexibility. Here again we recognize that ordinary qualities are not enough; and the greater the area of responsibility, the truer this assertion becomes. Headlong, dogged, or innate courage, overmastering ambition, or long familiarity with danger all must be present to a considerable degree if action in this debilitating element is not to fall short of achievements that in the study would appear a nothing out of the ordinary.   Danger is part of the friction of war. Without an accurate conception a danger we cannot understand war. Carl Von Clausewitz; Prussian Military Philosopher