| The first few days
of Isma`iyl's tenure brought
the only item of our preparations he oversaw: the building of our rival
sand rampart on the west bank of the canal. Our decision to provide covering
fire from the west bank meant-as Wasil had reminded
the President at that traumatic Armed Forces Supreme Council
meeting-that we needed a rampart of our own higher than the Israelis' as
a firing platform. (We actually began building a sand barrier in late
1969 to counter the Israeli one started 8-10 months earlier. The higher
they went with theirs, the higher we would go with ours, although theirs
was always higher and more complete.) For some time before his dismissal
Sadiq
had been pressing without success for LE.23 million from the contingency
funds to finish this.
Now, a few days after
Isma`iyl's
appointment, the cash was allocated. By the end of 1972 our engineers
had built, not a continuous rampart, but 30 separate ramps along the five
fronts, each about 70 feet high and containing almost 230,000
cubic yards of sand. Mammoth constructions, perfect firing platforms
for our tanks and anti-tank guided weapons in the opening stages of the
assault.
October 29, 1972,
1700 hours: Meanwhile the rumblings about Sadiq's
dismissal began. We did not have to wait long for proof that his views
were widely shared. General Sa`iyd al-Mahiy,
Director
of the Artillery Department, phoned to say that a young officer at
the artillery school had publicly criticized the President. The
commandant of the school had been explaining to the assembled young officers
why Sadiq had been dismissed.
(His text was a briefing hastily distributed bySadiq's
successor.) "The President knows nothing of military matters," one
of the young officers had said. Horror. But when an inquiry was hastily
set up, the young man denied-I presume on prudent advice-that he had said
it. His denial was accepted; the incident was gratefully closed. But far
more serious rumblings were to come.
November 11,
17 45 hours: Summoned to the President at Giyzah. Joined by the
Minister
of the Interior, Mamduwh Salim,
then by `Izzat Sulayman, Deputy
Director of the National Intelligence Service. A plot has been uncovered.
The affair had begun
a few days before, when a captain in the Defense Intelligence
Department stumbled on something which made him suspicious of a particular
group of officers. Instead of telling his superiors, he had gone straight
to the President Sadat,
having heard him, began to suspect the involvement of some Defense Intelligence
Department staff in whatever was afoot, and turned to the National Intelligence
Service to crack it. National Intelligence Service surveillance
had confirmed that officers, some known to be pro-Sadiq,
were meeting-and with such security that they could not learn what went
on at the meetings. By now thoroughly suspicious, the President
decided to strike at the group even before having a solid case. So here
we sat, listening to`Izzat Sulayman
lay out everything the National Intelligence Service has learned
about the organization.
Even its name,
"Save Egypt", proclaimed its naivete. The plain fact was that the group
accepted Sadiq's views.
They too believed
that a certain power was trying to push us into war while we were unprepared;
that this would lead to destruction of our armed forces, to the fall of
the regime, thence to political turmoil and so to the emergence of communism
in Egypt and its spread throughout the Arab world.
I disagreed with the
analysis. That was one cause of my difference with GeneralSadiq.
But Sadiq and I had been friends
for 30 years, since we were junior officers together. Not once had
I doubted his courage or patriotism, and I did not doubt it now. I disapproved
of what his adherents were doing; but I was morally certain Sadiq
was not acting as an agent on anyone's behalf. So I listened sadly as President
Sadat
launched into a denunciation of Sadiq
as a puppet in the hands of the Saudis. He was an agent of KingFaysal,
Sadat
said, accepting cash, gold, expensive gifts, and in return, carrying out
Faysal's
orders. Mamduwh Salim hastened
to confirm what the
President was saying. I sat silent, in no position
to refute the details, but silently recalling the letter Sadat
had
sent to Faysal only a year before,
asking Faysal to treat
Sadiq
as if he were Sadat
himself. Had Faysaldone just
that?
When the three of
us left the President at 2200 hours, we were under orders to arrest
and question all suspects. We went to the headquarters of the National
Intelligence Service and there I stayed until 05 00 hours next
morning when, having signed warrants for the arrest of military personnel
involved, I left for my own office to have a couple of hours sleep before
starting my normal day's work. The questioning was to be done by our military
prosecutor, but in National Intelligence Service headquarters.
November 12:
General
Mihriz,
Director
of the Defense Intelligence Service, was dismissed by the
President.
As the
National Intelligence Service interrogation wound on, more
names were mentioned, more arrests of military personnel required. In the
middle of it all, I now had to go to Kuwait for two days for an
Arab
Collective Defense Council meeting. (I will recount that later.)
November I5,
afternoon: When I got back from Kuwait, the questioning of those
linked to Save Egypt was still proceeding. (With the departure of
General
Mihriz,
the process had transferred to Defense Intelligence Department headquarters.)
And worse was to come. Late that evening, the military prosecutor asked
me to issue warrants for the arrest of General
`Abd al-Khabiyr, lately Commander of the Central District;
Colonel
`Umran,
a divisional commander;
Colonel Ahmad `Abd
al-Wahhab, Chief of Staff of a division, and Lieutenant
Colonel Mahmuwd `Isam,commander
of a ranger group. Their names had been given by others, the prosecutor
said; their involvement was almost certain. I gave my permission. They
were arrested shortly after 0130 hours.
By now I was becoming
alarmed. The situation looked more serious than I had first thought. I
imposed strict security measures, including an immediate ban on all military
movements.
November 16,
afternoon: To Defense Intelligence Department headquarters. To my
amazement, I was presented with the complete confessions of General
`Abd
al-Khabiyr and Lieutenant Colonel
`Adil.
It was hard to take
the sight of `Abd al-Khabiyr,
a colleague and senior commander only a fortnight before, under arrest
and interrogation. His confession was what I would have expected of a brave
man: he claimed full responsibility in an obvious effort to save the others.
Quietly, I asked him: "Is what you signed correct, and made of your
own free will?" Equally quietly, he replied: "Yes." I beckoned
the military prosecutor into another room. "I can see General`Abd
al-Khabiyr is still in good shape," I said. "But
I must impress upon you that it is absolutely forbidden to use force or
threats. Over and above that, he and all the others are to be treated with
respect and dignity." The prosecutor said he could give me his assurance
that he was against any sort of violence or threats; and that none had
been used to extract the confessions.
I read the statements
again. They were damning. The organization had planned to strike the previous
week, on November 9. It had been my daughter's wedding day; and
they had known that everyone who mattered, including the President,
would be at the ceremony that evening. They had planned to arrest us all
in one operation. Only when they had learned how heavily guarded the ceremony
would be had they postponed the coup.
As it happened, when
I left Defense Intelligence Department headquarters that afternoon, I was
bound for another wedding, that of Major `Abd
al-Mun`im al-Huny, one of the Libyan Revolutionary Council
whom I had met with Qadhdhafiy.
The ceremony was at the Shooting Club out by the Pyramids. President
Sadat
was already there, and I drew him into a corner and told him of the latest
confessions. He left shortly afterwards, his host accompanying him downstairs.
Suddenly the room was buzzing with people calling out: "The President
wants you." By the time I had pushed my way downstairs he had gone,
leaving orders I was to follow him. Without even letting my wife know,
I set off for Giyzah, catching the President at the door
of the residence. For half-an hour we paced back and forth on the steps
while the President thought aloud.
His real worry was
Sadiq.
Sadiq's
name had not been mentioned by the conspirators, but it was clear his thinking
dominated their actions. Three questions followed. How subversive were
Sadiq's
views? How many officers shared them? And where were they? (The President,
after all, had relied heavily on Sadiq's
personal advice in approving the most senior postings.)
"He was deceiving
me about who to choose," the President said, pacing up and down.
"Planting his own men, eliminating rivals." He turned to me: "What
is your opinion of . . ." and named an officer exiled by Sadiq
as a military attaché in Europe. He was a good soldier,
I replied. (He had in fact been the armored division commander whomSadiq
had not wanted to trust with 100 T- 62 tanks.) "Bring him back,"
the President said. "Tomorrow, bring him back."
I thought his impulsiveness
did credit to his heart but not to his head. "Mr. President," I
said, "if you will permit me, I would advise postponing that for a time."
"Why?" Sadat
asked.
"General Sadiq
accused anyone who disagreed with him of being a communist," I said.
"I myself suffered from his comments and insinuations. But if, now,
we start bringing people back it will be misinterpreted in the armed forces.
Are we rehabilitating them, or bringing them back as suspected conspirators?"
The President nodded:
"I think you are right. Let us postpone it."
We turned to the additional
security measures to be taken in Egypt. When I left him, still pacing
the steps, I had my orders. It was another hour before I could drive out
to bring my wife home from the wedding.
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