To indicate the size of these, I point out that they were stronger than many of the national forces within NATO or the Warsaw Pact in ground forces-much stronger, for instance, than either the British or French forces. And virtually everything had been supplied; on credit terms nobody else would have matched, by the Soviet Union. For me therefore, as I have said in discussing my differences with Sadiq, all debate about the wisdom of Egypt's relationship with the Soviet Union boiled down to a single question: "Is there any other country in the world which in the past, present or near future could or would supply Egypt with sufficient arms to give her the local superiority over Israel to liberate her territories?" The answer is no.

It is, of course, true that the United States was at the same time supplying Israel with weapons so profuse and sophisticated as to give them strategic superiority over all their Arab neighbors combined. The apex of this was Israel's Air Force, which could neutralize not only our air forces but our ground forces and navies as well. In that sense the United States was a "better" ally to Israel than the Soviet Union was to us. The point is irrelevant. The United States would never have supplied us.
And if our weapons lagged behind Israel's, the reason, albeit known to very few people, was that the Soviet Union was ten years behind the United States in air technology. For all the talk of NATO being a defensive organization, the fact is that its armorer, the United States, had developed the best penetrative fighter-bomber in the world: The Phantom with its array of electronics and missiles. The Soviet Union, by contrast, had concentrated on defensive fighters and anti-aircraft missiles. We had nothing to match the Phantom because the Soviet Union had nothing. (I have already acknowledged the truth of the Soviet claim that we could not have absorbed more aircraft than they supplied. The technological gap remains.)

Sadat's particular charges against the Soviet Union are trivial and, anyway, untrue:

That the Soviet Union supplied us with a few World War Two bridges, but we had to build two-thirds of our own. Not true. Ten of our twelve heavy bridges were supplied by the Soviets. True, only three were of their most modern PMP type; but the Soviet army itself did not then have many and a fourth PMP was airlifted in during the war. Ninety percent of our tanks and vehicles crossed into Sinai over Soviet bridges or ferries.

That the Soviet Union never supplied us with their satellite or 25 reconnaissance photographs. Not true. We used to complain we did not see enough photographs; but from time to time we would be shown new film to study, though never to take away or copy. To my personal knowledge, Sadat himself saw those pictures at least twice before the war and once during it. After the ceasefire of October 24, Soviet satellite photographs were our main source of information about enemy activity.

The truth is that we, not the Soviet Union, were the bad allies. During the war we persistently hid the facts from them. Their Chief Liaison Officer, General Samakhodsky, was never let into the Operations Room. He had to be content with briefings from one of our Defense Intelligence officers. To my certain knowledge, the facts about the enemy penetration at Deversoir and its subsequent development were concealed from them. (Though their satellites must have told them the truth.)

When, much later, I read in the memoirs of my Israeli counterpart, General David Elazar, that one of their first decisions after the outbreak of war had been to maintain direct and continuous contact between the Israeli high command and the Pentagon, telling the Americans all their plans and listening to American advice, I contrasted it with our own self-defeating opportunism.

Yet, despite all this, the Soviet Union mounted the biggest airlift in its history to help us. (Certainly, the Soviet's own prestige and military capabilities were at stake in our battle. But mutual interest is the cement of alliances, and we are considering their performance as allies.) The airlift had not been planned in advance. Yet it began three days after the outbreak of war and by its finish the Soviets had lifted about 15,000 tons of war material to Egypt and Syria. More than 900 round trips by their AN-12 and AN-22 transport aircraft.

Of course there were muddles. After the first week of war, we found that our consumption of short-range weapons such as the RPG-7 was much less than we had expected, while our demand for anti-tank guided weapons like the MALOTKA (SAGGER) was much greater. Alerting the planners in charge of the airlift in Moscow to amend their plans and reorganize the aircraft loads took time. So we sometimes got piles of weapons we did not need, while searching in vain for items we were desperate for. But it was an extraordinary operation. Tanks, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft missiles, ammunition and a host of other supplies reached us-more than half the material, and almost all the tanks, going to Syria. It reflects considerable credit to the Soviet Air Force-and to those in Egypt and Syria who so rapidly unloaded, sorted, checked, grouped and sent into battle this mass of material.

On top of that, the Soviet Union mounted a sea-borne resupply operation: no less than 63,000 tons, mainly to Syria, by October 30. (An operation, which could never have been carried out without the presence and swift reinforcement of a Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean.)

At the end of it all, I have to say, the Russians remained resolutely Russian which is to say some of them were as harsh and obstinate as ever. A month after the war General Lashnekov, who had been Chief Soviet Liaison Officer in Cairo in 1968-69, came to Egypt to be briefed on the military situation. Isma`iyl, Ma’muwn, a few others and myself met Lashnekov in the Operations Room. Describing our experiences in anti-tank warfare, I praised the MALOTKA and the RPG-7. But I said we had found their supposedly portable B-10 and B-11 recoilless antitank guns too heavy in practice.

"If Soviet scientists could lengthen the range of the RPG-7 to cover the dead ground of the MALOTKA, the two would work in great harmony and we could replace the much heavier B-10 and B-11, with the much lighter RPG," I said.

Lashnekov was brusque: "Russian scientists calculate everything and do not need such ideas," he said. "Soviet weapons are excellent. We made them and we know it:"

"You may have made them," I said. "We have fought with them. If you know everything why are you here questioning us?"

The Minister stepped in to cool the situation. But a few minutes later Lashnekov was making equally blunt -and ill-formed-criticisms of the deployment of our air force.

Our Arab brothers had also proved staunch to our support, belying the persistent denigration of their leaders by President Sadat. Again to put the record straight, these were the reinforcements they sent to the fronts:

IRAQ: I pay particular tribute to the Iraqi Hunter pilots for the daring and skill of their anti-tank strikes in Sinai. They swiftly gained such a reputation that our field commanders, calling for air support, would frequently ask for the Iraqi squadron. To the Syrian front, meanwhile, the Iraqis-despite their reservations before the war did not hesitate to send reinforcements once battle started. Two Iraqi fighter squadrons were flying combat missions from October 8. Two other squadrons joined in later. And the forward elements of one armored and one infantry division arrived at the Syrian front on October 11.

ALGERIA: Its three squadrons arrived in Egypt through October 9-11. The armored brigade arrived on October 17. Apart from this military support, Algeria deposited 200 million dollars with the Soviet Union in the first days of November to finance Egyptian and Syrian arms purchases. (GHQ was told of this on November 12 and ordered to prepare a hundred-million-dollar list of needs.)

LYBIA: Its forces were in Egypt even before the war started.

MOROCCO: When King Hasan learned of the outbreak of hostilities, he sent the infantry brigade he had promised by every available transport aircraft, including those of his national airline. The King's military aide, Colonel Delemy, came to visit their men at the end of October and called on me. "The King sends his congratulations and best wishes," he said. "He tells me to say that if you had told him you needed the brigade so urgently he would have sent it with you."
"Convey my thanks to the King," I said. "I hope his majesty understands the position I was in."

As with our Soviet allies, of course, our collaboration with our Arab brothers was not always free of problems. Some reinforcements were rushed to the battle without prior planning. Some were too poorly equipped or trained to be useful. Others, for example the Sudanese infantry brigade, were of admirable standard but, because of transport problems, arrived too late to join in.

It remained a great achievement: the finest collaboration among the Arabs since 1948. That merely made it the harder to bear the tragedy we faced with the wholly avoidable encirclement of our Third Army on October 24.
 
 
 

(To be continued)

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