Vice President 'Anwar al-Sadat and Secretary General of the Arab Socialist Union `Aliy Sabriy,  at the far right, paying their respects to the body of President Nasir, lying in state at the Qubbah Palace (September 29, 1970).
 
 

EPISODE FIFTEEN

I -SADAT SEIZES POWER

 Sadat came to power by mere chance. President Nasir., before he died, had not intended to leave the reins of government in Sadat's hands, but Nasir.'s sudden death upset all his expectations for succession.Sadat had served 18 years under Nasir. During this period, he was nothing more than a yes man to anything Nasir. would say, and therefore he survived. In 1969, about a year before Nasir.'s death, he appointed Sadat  as Vice President. Of course, Nasir., being the strong man of Egypt and the Arab world, would not appoint any Vice President who would create a menace to his absolute authority. It is rumored that on September 28, 1970, feeling he was about to die, Nasir. quickly gave instructions to Samiy Sharaf (Minister for Presidential Affairs) that Zakariya Muhiyy al-Diyn should be appointed as First Vice President and an announcement was to be made immediately over the radio. Things went faster than he expected, and he died the same day without the presidential decree being published. It is said that Samiy Sharaf, together with Sha`rawiy Gum`ah  the Minister of Interior, were eager to seize power after the death of Nasir and thought it would be better for them to deal with a weak rather than a strong president. They did not disclose or announce Nasir.'s decision to appoint Zakariya Muhiyy al-Diyn as First Vice President while they were watching the dying man. Thus, through his demonstrated weakness, and through the support of Samiy Sharaf and Sha`rawiy Gum`ah who both had considerable political power in the Arab Socialist Union, the only political party in Egypt-Sadat became President of Egypt on October 15, 1970.
        For his first seven months as president, Sadat was a man without any real power. He was exactly the kind of president Samiy Sharaf  and Sha`rawiy Gum`ah wanted him to be. Yet on May 13, 1971, Sadat carried out a military coup and arrested all his political rivals, including Samiy Sharaf and Sha`rawiy Gum`ah. His coup was carried out and supported by both General L. Nasif Commander of the Presidential Bodyguard, and by General M. A. Sadiq who was then the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. It is only since then that one can really say that Sadat had seized power.
 
 
 
 

October 19, 1970: A meeting of the commanders of the armed forces, chaired for the first time by President Sadat. The new President praises his predecessor and pledged to follow the policies of Nasir.(See Appendix :  Shazliy's Comments on Sadat's conferences .)

December 30: Another commanders conference chaired by Sadat. A long survey of the situation from the of War, General Muhammad Fawziy. Sadat spoke briefly. When the cease fire expired on February 7, 1971, he said there would be no further extension. He asked that the armed forces be prepared to resume action. We should be ready to fight with the means at hand, he said, without waiting for more or better. He concluded: "Do not believe the American and Israeli propaganda, which says that our relationship with the Soviet Union is bad. They want it to be bad, but it is not." 

March 23, 1971: The President called a general meeting of senior officers from all commands. I and four others represented Red Sea District. 

 He began by trying to explain why he had, after all, extended the cease fire on February 4. Egypt had taken the diplomatic initiative, he said. He gave no details, but claimed Egypt had isolated Israel from the world community-he mentioned the United States, Britain and the European Economic Community, Spain and Iran! We could not risk these international gains by rejecting an extension of the cease fire when Israel had already accepted one. Not that the world would be fooled, he said. Israel had informed the United Nations Secretary General on February 21 that they would never withdraw to their 1967 borders. Their aggressive and expansionist attitude was revealed to all. He distributed copies of a map of Sinai, divided by a line running south from a point west of Rafah (the Egyptian frontier) to a point west of Sharm al-Shaykh. Israel, the President said, claimed to be ready to evacuate west of that line but insisted on annexing the territory to the east. (See Map #1 attached and Appendix: Comments on Sadat's Conferences.) Sadat attacked the United States: "We have no faith in  America. I have written to Nixon, telling him we put no trust in his country's promises but judge it instead by  its actions." He also chastised other Arab countries for playing politics with the Palestinian cause. He singled  out Algeria and President  Buw Madyan (Boumedienne) "He has sold himself to the Americans, politically and economically.  He has just signed a contract with American companies his economy will be absolutely tied to America's. 

April 18: An historic meeting of the Armed Forces Supreme Council (AFSC) Chairman: War Minister Fawziy. As Commander of the Red Sea District I was not a member of the Armed Forces Supreme Council, but I  was summoned. The topic was the newly announced Union of Arab Republics between Egypt, Libya and Syria. 

Fawziy began by saying he had been told officially of the Union only hours before it had been given to the  papers. He remained uncertain of the reasons for it: "Our relations with Syria are already very good. The Syrian Armed Forces are already under my command;  and it is already agreed that they will operate in the future in full coordination with Egypt's." Fawziy implied strongly, in other words, that he disagreed with the Union, and he ended by claiming that the Chief of Staff, General  Muhammad Sadiq was in total agreement with him.

     Fawziy then said he wanted each of us to give our views. He was going to what he described as "a political meeting at the highest level," where he was supposed to transmit the opinion of the armed forces. Clearly, he meant a meeting of the Supreme Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union. From his tone, it also seemed clear that the great majority, perhaps all, of that committee was also against the Union and had been as surprised as Fawziy by it. So the new President had acted without discussion with the country's political leadership. Fawziy, using well-covered and well-chosen words, was in fact asking the Armed Forces Supreme Council to choose between the President and the Arab Socialist Union, with the winner taking political power. 

There were 16 of us, counting Fawziy and our minute taker, the ministry's Secretary General, Brigadier `Amir al-Nazir. I was twelfth in seniority. As Fawziy skipping Sadiq began his canvass in order of seniority, I engaged myself in noting the views of my colleagues and superiors. To my astonishment the nine before me all attacked the Union, the only variation being the harshness of their condemnation. Whatever we remaining said, in other words, the majority vote had already been cast. A fine excuse to run for cover, I reflected. 

But I supported the Union and I proceeded to say so, arguing its positive side-another attempt to foster the Arab unity we all professed to want and rejecting most of the previous speaker's arguments as contrary to common sense. One clause in the treaty of the Union, for instance, gave any two signatories the right to intervene militarily to topple a future regime in the third if it were hostile to the Union. I argued, contrary to the others, that it was Libya which ought to fear this, not Egypt, since in no way could Libya or Syria invade Egypt, whereas Libya could never withstand an Egyptian assault. 

When a grievous speaker heckled me, Fawziy silenced him. I was grateful for the assistance, but I did not confuse courtesy with conviction. When the others spoke, all against the Union, I felt even more isolated. Fawziy closed the meeting, delighted: "I can see that all of you except General Shazliy are against this Union. I will express your views to the meeting I am going to attend." 

Suddenly the officer who had heckled me said: "We have not heard General Sadiq's view. Before we break up, let us hear it." Fawziy looked at Sadiq sitting on his right, and asked him to speak. Sadiq, befitting a former director of the Defense Intelligence Department was a wary, suspicious man. There were two points which worried him, he said. The first was that the Soviet Union supported the Union; he did not see the logic of that. The second was the inclusion of Syria, despite the bad experience of Egypt's first attempt at a union in 1958. But for those, he said, he would have supported the pact! The heckler intervened once more, brusquely repeating his demand to know Sadiq's view "yes or no." Sadiq said he was against it. I was alone. 

 The meeting broke up around 22.00 hours. Next day I drove back to my Red Sea HQ, braced for the worst in the storm that was coming........ 
 

 (To be continued)
 

October 1970 - May 1971.During this period the President was without real power and, therefore, repeated the slogans he inherited from Nasir, such as:"What is taken by force could only be retaken by force." He could not challenge the Supreme Executive Committee and call for anything but war; yet in fact, he was playing a double role. He was trying to convince the Egyptian people and the Soviet Union that he was prepared and willing to go to war, while at the same time secretly trying to convince the Americans that he really wanted peace. He is a typical Machiavellian ruler. Grasping this fact will make it easier to compare what he says with what he does. 

March 23, 1971. The object of the conference was to convince us that he will never negotiate with the enemy. That the enemy is intransigent and will never withdraw troops from Sinai and the other occupied Arab territories unless forced. He distributed the map showing the Israeli demands in order to show us the impossibility of negotiating with them.

June 3, 1971. He was seeking support of the armed forces. He was trying to convince the senior commanders, that his action against his political opponents on May 5 (in fact, his coup) was within his constitutional rights  was not, as we know now. The majority vote in the supreme Executive Committee was against him. The reason he gave for arresting them was that they were trying to impose trusteeship on him, which they had never done with Nasir.

November 4, November 19, 1971.He was trying to convince the Egyptians and the Soviets that he really wanted war that all his moves toward peace were just to gain time. 

January 2, 1972. He wanted to save face after all the propaganda that he was going to war before the end of 1971. He put all the blame on the Soviet Union for Sadat there is always someone to blame. 

June 6, 1972. He acknowledged the report prepared by General ‘Isma`iyl, Director of the National Intelligence Service, that Egypt was not ready to go to war, and declared that he and his War Minister, General Saadiq are of the same opinion. Nevertheless, he dismissed Saadiq four months later, accusing him of not wanting to go to war. Between Sadat's conference of June 6, 1972, and the dismissal of Sadiq on October 26, 1972, not a single rifle had been added to the weapons we had.
 

NEXT:  EPISODE SEVENTEEN:  
DEALING WITH THE RUSSIANS