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long series of events that took place in Egypt during the 20th
century, and through which many of our generations have lived, have
consisted almost exclusively of one recurrent theme: an endless struggle
to achieve and maintain our independence, either militarily or politically.
The trend has been so continuous that it may well engender an attitude
of fatalism.
Egyptians
may tend to think that men are but the playthings of an inexorable historical
fate, which carries them along. Sometimes to success and sometimes
to failure. All this should lead us to examine events of our history in
some detail, to try and discover the causes, which form the connecting
links between them.
Among
these events, the Suez episode is particularly rich in lessons,
both because of the importance of its consequences and because the operation
was limited both in time and space. It is possible to see, in the raw,
the effect of those factors which led to the 1956 Suez crisis and
beyond.
Because
of its length, this article has been divided into several parts.
In this month's issue I will start with the first part:
Salah El-Din El-Homosany
In
the aftermath of WW II, Great Britain expecting Egypt to
appeal to the Security Council to order them to evacuate Egypt and
Sudan,
British officials sought full American support of their efforts to meet
this challenge to their strategic and political interests.
Meanwhile
American policy pursued conflicting objectives namely of mollifying Egyptian
nationalism while preserving vital Western strategic interests in Egypt.
The
American pursuit of irreconcilable objectives created discord with Britain,
with the consequences of failing to improve relations with Egypt,
and diminishing the United States' ability to settle the Anglo-Egyptian
controversy. Renewed strategic interest in the Suez Canal Zone base
strongly determined the British position toward the Egyptian appeal to
the Security Council
American
strategists fully agreed that Britain must maintain its presence
in Egypt, but some American officials wanted Britain to compromise
with Egyptian national aspirations. Anglo-American differences of opinion
also surfaced regarding the best means to respond to the Egyptian challenge
and the American role in the Security Council debates.
In
late March 1947, the Foreign Office explicitly asked for American
support in this matter suggesting that S. Pinckney Tuck, the American
ambassador in Cairo, warn King Farouq and Prime Minister Mahmoud
El-Noqrashy that an appeal to the United Nations would be in for a
rough time and will not receive US support.
To
complicate the situation, Egypt sought American support for its
appeal to the Security Council. On 27 March, Egyptian Pime Minister
el-Noqrashy offered to back the anti-Soviet strategy enunciated in
the Truman Doctrine provided the United States helped Egypt escape
the shackles of foreign domination. Mahmoud Hassan, the Egyptian
ambassador in Washington, advised the Americans to side with
Egypt at the United Nations in an effort to heal the damage
caused by Washington's pro-British "intervention" of May 1946.
A
Security Council decision favorable to Britain, other Egyptian officials
warned, would destabilize the Middle East and generate Arab misunderstanding
about American objectives around the world. State Department officials
refused Egypt's requests.
For
financial and ideological reasons Great Britain announced plans
in January and February 1947 to grant independence to
India, to end economic and military assistance to Greece and
Turkey,
and to surrender the British mandate over Palestine.
Having
eyed Palestine as a potential replacement base site when they agreed
in May 1946 to evacuate Egypt, British Foreign Office and
War Office planners thus became determined to retain base rights in Egypt
and urged their
Prime Minister Clement Attlee to exclude evacuation
of that country from his plans to retract the boundaries of empire.
Departure
from the
Suez Canal Zone would draw Soviet influence into the area,
the Foreign Office argued, and heighten the probability of world war in
which the British would be massacred.
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