Over
the years the Suez Canal Zone base, had grown like Topsy during
and after the war. Now it was currently the largest military installation
that Britain had anywhere in the world. To a certain extent,
the Suez Canal Zone base with some 70,000 British troops
replaced the lost Indian Army in Imperial strategy, and constituted a vital
bastion in the Cold War. Fundamentally, therefore, the British never expected
or intended to quit particularly in view of the lever it gave over
the oil regions of the Middle East. For us Egyptians this
was what our press called al-masa'la al-watania or the "National
Problem."
The
1936
Treaty
by which the base had been legitimized did not run out until
1956 and
specifically envisaged a period of prolongation. General Erskine,
made no bones about the matter: we shall never leave the Canal
Zone. The British had wanted to retain the base, and King Farouq
had
needed the British presence as an insurance policy against his own people.
So the base had remained, despite periodic outbursts from the Wafd,
because it was to the interest of at least two sides of the old triangle
of power in Egypt that it should remain.
Military
strategists elaborated the reasons why Western security depended on base
rights in the Suez Canal Zone. Egypt is the key to the whole position
of the Middle East in its relation to the defense of the Commonwealth,
the Memorandum of the Chiefs of Staff specified. The Canal Zone was
the only spot from which Western forces could counter Soviet aggression
with an active and immediate defense in the form of limiting the aggressors'
weight of attack.
Unless
Britain
retained
base rights in Egypt, hostilities against the Soviet Union
would entail long, arduous and costly operations before we could even start
hitting back at the enemy; in fact, the United Kingdom would begin the
war by fighting in the last ditch. It is essential, they believed, that
Soviet expansion in the middle east be contained.Because of Britain's
historic strength in the region and the United States' expanding
commitments elsewhere, "it is our strong feeling that the British should
continue to maintain primary responsibility for military security in that
area." Near East Affairs (NEA) officials hoped to use the Pentagon
talks to underscore the commonality of American and British policy in the
Middle
East and to organize a framework of cooperation and coordination for
executing policy in the region.
The
objective of containment explained NEA's willingness to sacrifice
its desire to mollify Egyptian nationalism in favor of preserving British
strategic interests in the Middle East."
In
addition, American contingency war plans conceived in 1947 underscored
the importance of maintaining British military rights in Egypt,
a point commonly neglected by historians (1)
In
the event of war with the Soviet Union, American strategists still
planned to initiate a powerful air offensive against vital strategic
elements of the Soviet war making capacity, particularly petroleum
production, underscored the critical importance of Egypt in this
offensive. Within two thousand miles of the Suez Canal Zone,
the Joint Strategic Planning Group pointed out, lay 94 percent
of Soviet oil refineries. B-29 bombers with this range launched
from India could reach only
83 percent of Soviet refineries,
from Britain only 25 percent, and from Japan and Alaska
less than 2 percent. Bombers based in Egypt could also reach
major Soviet mineral fields. As the JCS summarized, the Canal
Zone is within the closest operating range of the greatest percentage
of those industrial complexes vital to the Soviet war effort. Moreover,
Egyptian air bases had other desirable features enumerated in earlier war
plans. They could be defended, supplied, and used as staging areas for
offensive ground operations in the theater.
To
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the retention and
use of the Cairo-Suez area represents initially the minimum Allied
requirement in the Middle East, Harry R. Borowski observed
that and other contingency plans of the late 1940s
envisioned actions
beyond American supply, logistical, and manpower capabilities. This point
should not detract from the value that American strategists assigned to
Egyptian air bases. In the event of war, the Pentagon had every intention
of using Egyptian bases for an air offensive and other operations.(2)
Bevin's
proposal presumed that British security needs in the Middle East could
be served from base sites in locations other than the Suez Canal Zone,
but his colleagues in the Ministry of Defense disagreed. The difficulty
in the way of this proposal, the joint Planning Committee advised,
"is
the absolute indispensability of Egypt as a base for a major war in the
Middle East .. It is essential, therefore, that we obtain the right of
re-entry into Egypt and also that we ensure that those facilities are adequately
maintained in peace . . . . No facilities which can be developed anywhere
else in the Middle East . . could be accepted as complete substitutes
for those in Egypt." (3)
In
February 1948, Bevin agreed with Minister of Defense A. V Alexander
that Britain must coordinate Middle East strategic plans with the
United
States, and after meeting with British Lieutenant General
John T Crocker in mid-April, Bevin recognized the extreme
importance of base rights in the Canal Zone in light of the current
global situation. Although he would continue to seek base rights in Sudan,
Libya, and other places, Bevin confirmed that Britain
must maintain military facilities in Egypt, and he suspended his
plans to make concessions to Egyptian aspirations.(4)
American
strategists continued to favor the maintenance of British military rights
in Egypt over the demands of Egyptian nationalism. Secretary
of Defense James V Forrestal confirmed in August 1947 that current
and projected war plans all recognized the need to hold "the Cairo-Suez-
area . . . as a minimum" because of its air bases and their
proximity to the Soviet Union and Middle East oil fields. "Any
sustained and therefore decisive action against nation X," Forrestal explained
to Truman "would have to take place largely from the Mediterranean and
its environs. In addition, the North African Coast is superior to England
as an airbase in view of the problems that arise in such a densely populated
area when attacked by guided missiles, rockets and bombs." The next
day, Lt. General Alfred Gruenther (5)
made
it clear to Forrestal that the United States most highly valued
bases in the eastern Mediterranean-Middle East region, rather than
North
Africa in general.
The
collapse of the Anglo-Egyptian base negotiations in early 1948 coincided
with an increase in East-West tensions in Europe that in turn diminished
Bevin's
willingness to risk strategic interests in the Middle East by making concessions
to Egyptian nationalism. Consequently the strategic containment policy
of the Soviet Union dictated that access to Egyptian air bases be
preserved, even at the cost of exacerbating Egyptian nationalism.
In
the spring of 1948, American strategists reaffirmed the need for
access to Suez Canal Zone air bases if war erupted against
the Soviet Union. Studies by Strategic Air Command planners determined
that these bases could be defended against Soviet invasion thirty days
longer than most bases in Europe and fifteen days longer than bases in
Spain,
Turkey,
Palestine, or the Arabian peninsula. Egyptian air bases were
also closer to priority targets in the Soviet Union and less vulnerable
to harassment from Soviet fighters than bases in the British Isles.
Studies by the JCS exploring alternative air base sites in the Middle
East confirmed that the bases in the Suez Canal Zone were without
doubt the most valuable in the region.
(6)
American
officials sided fully with Britain during the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations
in early
1950 because British base rights in Egypt remained
consonant with American strategic interests. "In the event of global
war," the National Security Council (NSC) decided in late 1949,the
United States would probably wish to use facilities in the Cairo-Suez
area in conjunction with the British.
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