| Between
October
1951 and January 1953, American officials tried to stabilize
Egypt and the Middle East by establishing a defense organization
in Egypt, resolving Anglo-Egyptian disputes, and curbing the growth
of Egyptian nationalism.
Consonant
with their policy since late 1950, they focused on the defense organization
as the key step to reach their objective. American and British officials
varied the exact shape of the defense arrangement, shedding the original
command conception in favor of a more fluid planning and coordinating body.
Moreover,
the Americans implemented new tactics, such as pressuring Britain to
make concessions to Egypt, mediating between London and Cairo,
and offering military aid to Egypt, to attain their goal.
However, White House sympathy for Israel, prevented
Acheson
from extending the military aid, and other restraints limited the economic
aid he offered to Egypt. Inhibited by domestic factors, Acheson
failed
to establish close relations with Egypt upon which MEDO
(Middle
East Defense Organization) establishment depended.
Hence
the fundamental objective of American policy remained stability based on
a regional defense organization. Before the Egyptian Revolution of
July
1952, American officials failed to establish MEDO in
Egypt
because they were unwilling to accept an end to British occupation of the
Canal
Zone, the price Cairo demanded for its cooperation.
In
early 1952, physical improvements on the air base at Abu Sueir were completed,
making it the only base in the entire Middle East capable of handling heavy
bombers. American strategists were also secretly coordinating plans with
the British to stockpile war materials at Abu Sueir and to equip Cairo
International Airport to handle heavy bombers in war. The JCS, Bradley
told Lovett (1),
believed "that the United States should support politically It would
be a severe blow to Western security interests," Acheson told Eden, "if
the present unusual opportunity to settle the Anglo-Egyptian dispute is
lost. (2)
American
officials considered it imperative for Britain to maintain and possess
access to military facilities in the Canal Zone. Cognizant of Egyptian
national aspirations, they tried to mediate a settlement between London
and
Cairo
and encourage the British to concede on the Sudan issue. But they
consistently avoided pressuring the British to make the one concession,
unconditional evacuation of the Canal Zone, that might have satisfied
Egyptian nationalism and drawn Cairo toward participation in MEDO.
Because it demanded concessions to Egyptian nationalism that were irreconcilable
with Western strategic imperatives,
MEDO was not established.
The
State
Department viewed the impasse as part of a broader crisis in the
Middle East exacerbated by British intransigence in Egypt and
Iran.
"The whole thing looks bad," Acheson told Eden in
the wake of the the burning of Cairo in January 26, 1952,
blaming Britain's "splutter of musketry" at Ismailia the
day before for provoking the conflagration.
American
officials became irritated that the British, apparently impervious
to the power of Arab nationalism, were endangering the entire Middle
East by provoking the Egyptians.
Already
angry at British unwillingness to make any concessions to Iran,
they became convinced that indefinite stalemate between Britain and
two Middle East nations would drive the entire region toward a neutralist
orientation. "I am greatly disturbed by the situation in Egypt,"
Acheson
told Eden. "I fear that unless the situation is changed substantially
in the immediate future, opportunity for negotiations with moderate elements
will have been lost and achievement of Western objectives with respect
to Egypt thrown into grave doubt." The longer the British postponed
settlement, he argued, the greater the demands Egyptian leaders would make.
The prime minister and other hard-liners in the british cabinet rejected
this idea, however, and Eden dutifully pursued their rigid policy.
(3)
However
determined to preserve strategic imperatives in the Canal Zone,
Pentagon officials protested the idea of compelling the British to
make concessions to Egypt such as evacuation of the Canal Zone.
Contingency war plans still depended on Western access to these facilities,
at a minimum as poststrike landing and refueling sites for heavy bombers
launched from the British Isles.
(1)
Bradley
to Lovett, 25 June 1952, RG 330, CD 0921Egypt)1952; and NSC 129J1, 24 Apr.
1952, RG 273. See also memorandum by Slessor, 1 Mar. 1952, Slessor Papers,
"Bomber Policy" folder; memorandum by Mackworth-Young, 31 Mar. 1952, FO
371197032, JE1536/1; JSPC 6841130, 1 Nov. 1952, RJCS: Middle East, reel
1; and Poole, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pp. 167-70.
(2) Acheson
to Gifford, 31 Jan. 1952, RG 59, 641.74. See also memorandum of conversation
by Battle, 27 Jan. 1952, RG 59, 774.00; Berry to Acheson, 27 Jan.-12 Feb.
1952, Holmes to Acheson, 26, 27 Jan. 1952, Gifford to Acheson, 28 Jan.-12
Feb. 1952, Acheson to Gifford, 28 Jan., 5 Feb. 1952, memorandum of conversation
by Kopper, 31 Jan. 1952, RG 59, 641.74; memorandum of conversation by Perkins,
28 Jan. 1952, Acheson Papers, Secretary of State Series, box 67; Franks
to Eden, 27, 29 Jan. 1952, Eden to Franks, 31 Jan. 1952, and minute by
Eden, 8 Feb. 1952, FO 371/96921-22, JE1052/71-111; memorandum of conversation
by Ortiz, 31 Jan. 1952, RG 59, 611.74; minutes of cabinet meeting, 1 Feb.
1952, Connelly Papers, box 1; and memorandum by Eden, 11 Feb. 1952, CAB
129/49, C(52/32.
(3)
Eden
to Churchill, 10 Mar. 1952, FO 8001768, Egl52J25. See also Eden to Stevenson,
16 Apr. 1952, and minutes of meetings, 21-24 Apr. 1952, ibid., Eg/52/37-40.
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