In
what political and economic direction would the free officers seek
to steer their country which had been mismanaged for so long by foreign
sovereigns and exploited by an energetic and industrialized Europe? By
religion, Egypt is Muslim, linked with Asian, Indian,
African and even Chinese Islam; and since Islam itself
sprang from Arabia, it is only natural that Egypt, as the
biggest and potentially the most powerful state in the middle East, should
feel destined to be the leader of the Arabs, especially since the great
mosque-university of Al-Azhar, makes Cairo a vital power-point
in the Islamic world. Yet a glance at the map shows that Egypt is
in fact in Africa, its very existence depending on a Nile waters
which spring from deep down in that hat, perplexed continent, and the physionomy
of the fellah, as well as his passive character with its furious undertones,
is more African than levantine. At the same time, Egypt is a Mediterranean
nation, liked to age-old trading traditions, and for over a century its
economy had been geared to Western free-enterprise routines. Few countries,
it must be admitted, have a personality so agonizingly split. In his own
writings - or at any rate in the thoughts he expressed to Mohammed Hassanein
Heikal, who ghosted them into a slim volume called - The Philosophy
of the Revolution - Gamal Abdel Nasser voiced the dilemma,
and the aspirations of his fellow free officers.
"As
I sit in my study I often ask myself, What is our positive role in this
troubled world, and in what scene do we play that role?" He
wrote. "We are in a group of circles which should be the theatre of
our activity, and in which we try to move as much'as possible. We cannot
look at a map of the world without realizing our place therein, and the
role assigned to us by that position. We cannot ignore that there is an
Arab circle surrounding us and that this circle is as much part of us as
we are part of it; that our history has been merged with it and that its
interests are linked with ours . . . We cannot ignore that there is a
continent of Africa in which. fate has placed us and which is destined
today to witness a terrible struggle for its future. This struggle will
affect us whether we want it or not.
"Nor
can we ignore that there is a Muslim world to which we are tied by bonds
forged not only by religious faith but also by the facts of history . .
.
"All
these are fundamental facts, the roots of which lie deep in our life.
"History
is full of glorious achievements of heroes who carved great and heroic
roles which they played at decisive moments on its stage' he continued.
History is also full of roles of glorious heroism for which no actors were
available at decisive moments on its stage.
"I
do
not know why I always imagine that in this region there is a role wandering
aimlessly about in search of an actor to play it. And I do not know why
this role, tired of roaming about in this vast region, should at last settle
down, exhausted and weary, on our frontiers beckoning us to assume it as
nobody else can do so.
"Let
me hasten to say that this is not a role of leadership. It is a role of
interaction and experimentation with all these factors, a role for us to
harness the powerful energy latent in every part of this vast region and
carry out experiments with that tremendous force to enable it to play a
decisive part in ameliorating the future of humanity." |
In
the 1950's the winds of change were still blowing softly, and these
statesmen could not, or would not, appreciate that after centuries of subjugation
to one foreign Power after another the basic, burning desire of every Egyptian
was to run his affairs in his own way without exterior interference - to
be master of his own destiny, no more, and no less.
Nasser
ends his little book by saying
| "When
I analyse the elements of our strength, I cannot help being struck by three
sources standing in bold relief, which should be taken into account before
everything else. The first of these sources lies in the fact that we are
a group of neighbouring nations welded into a homogeneous whole by every
possible material and moral tie that would unite any group of nations.
The second is our land itself, and the position it occupies on the map
of the world - that important strategic position which makes it the cross-roads
of the world - the main route of its trade and the highway of its armies.
There remains the third source. This is oil . . . a vital element of strength. |
Whatever
else it may do, this slender volume reveals Gamal Abdel Nasser as
a patriotic idealist animated by an overwhelming desire to promote the
welfare and expansion of Egypt and the Arab cause. His destiny,
as it soon became evident, was to lash the winds of change up to hurricane
force and to become a vital factor in the cold war. Few Egyptians at this
period felt personally involved in the great struggle between East and
West,
most of them having little reason for feeling that the capitalist system
is superior to the communist one, or that communism is better than capitalism;
but the Egyptians had their own chip on their shoulders. By tactful and
sympathetic handling it would not have been impossible to keep
Egypt
in
the western camp. As it was, the unimaginative and extraordinarily ham-fisted
policies adopted by London, Paris and Washington alike
only hastened the appearance of the Soviet Union on Egyptian. soil,
and the barely disguised antagonism of the West was a poor alternative
in Arab hearts to the warm glow which soon began to radiate from the north-east.
On
the home front, meanwhile,
Nasser's immediate aim was abundantly
clear. The dissolute monarchy had been destroyed; the corrupt old political
parties had been disbanded; a start had been made on social and agrarian
reforms, and what Nasser now wanted more than anything else was
to eliminate the last bastion of colonialism which kept Egypt firmly
in the tutelage of England - the presence of some 70,000 British
troops in the Canal Zone.
For
the British the Suez Canal has grown in importance to become their
major bastion in the Cold War. Fundamentally, therefore, the British
never expected or intended to quit - particularly in view of the lever
it gave over the oil regions of the Middle East. The 1936 Treaty
by which the base had been legitimized did not run out until 1956 and
specifically envisaged a period of prolongation. General Erskine,
the GOC, made no bones about the matter. "You can take it from
me" he privately confided in 1952, "we shall never
leave the Canal Zone."
This
intransigence became apparent in the aftermath of the conclusion of the
Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan was expected by Britain and
the United States to partially solve the difficulties ofthe referred
to by Dulles. Nevertheless, relations between Egypt and Great
Britain remained tense after that. The Egyptians, now more than ever,
were becoming impatient with what seemed to them the British delaying tactics
in regard to the question of evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone
(4). In fact the same day the Sudan accord was reached, General
Naguib stated in a Press conference that he hoped the accord would
pave the way for immediate talks on the British withdrawal from the Canal
Zone.
(5)Three
days later, Dr. Mohammad Fawzi, Egypt's Foreign Minister,
reported that his Government had officially informed the British Ambassdor
at Cairo, that Egypt was ready for talks on the British evacuation
.(6)
As
there was no immediate and satisfactory response from the British Government,
the Free Officers resorted to threats of guerrilla action against
the British forces in Egypt .(7)
The
Egyptian Government made it quite plain from the very start of their informal
consultations with the British Ambassador, and also made public statements,
that they would require unconditional British agreement to withdraw
all troops from the Canal Zone within a stated period, expressed
in months rather than in years,"(8)
as a prelude to discussions about a possible new agreement for mutual defence.
Unless unconditional withdrawal of the British troops was an accomplished
fact, they here not willing to discuss anything with Great Britain
or any other nation. Great Britain, on the other hand, was pressing
to make an agreement on the troops and installations in the Canal Zone
a part of wider agreement on the defense of the Middle East, in
other words, to make alliance". (9)
In
its 'Note' of 27 February 1953 the British Government, stating
its terms for negotiations on the future of the Canal Zone, insisted
on Egyptian agreement to the return of British forces in case of war, and
that British or NATO technicians should remain behind to oversee
military installations there. The Royal Air Force was to be allowed
also to share with the Egyptian Air Force eight bases in the Canal
Zone. It was also suggested that if Egypt accepted these terms,
substantial American and British economic aid would follow. (10)
The
difference between the parties was really one of confidence. Neither trusted
the other sufficiently to desert the entrenched positions in which they
had dug themselves. Egypt maintained the right of a sovereign state
to choose whether or not to have foreign troops on its territory, Great
Britain took its stand on possession on the 1936 Treaty, and
on the necessities of the cold war. (11)
Further
Britain
hoped
that the
Sudan
would eventually join the British Commonwealth.
In his statement issued in Khartoum on
25 March 1953, Selwyn
Lloyd,
British Minister of State, had stated that membership
of the British Commonwealth was not inconsistent with independence;
that an independent Sudan might suggest any relationship it cared
for.(12)
These
reported statements spontaneously created a stir in Egyptian official circles
and hardened their attitude on the Canal Zone issue. General
Naguib who was then touring the Upper Egypt, strongly reacted
by telling the media:
| We
want unconditional and total evacuation. There will either be evacuation
or annihilation. We will live free or die honest. The whole world knows
our viewpoint. (13) |
Wing
Commander Abdel Latif el Boghdadi, a member of the RCC and
a close confident of Gamal Abdel Nasser, made the following forthright
statement on the Canal Zone issue on 31 March 1953
| We
ask all Egyptians. everywhere, to be prepared to strike when the time comes
because you are able to strike the tyrant and oppressor. You dealt a splendid
blow in the past, you will strike again if necessary, without
hesitation Nothing will dissuade us until we see the last of the
Bristish forces of evacuating.
Egypt
would not resort to negotiations whatever the circumstances. Evacuation
must come first and it should be unconditional. We shall accept no conditions.
Once evacuation has been realized we shall negotiate with whom we like
for the interest of our country alone.
The
day of struggle is coming, there is no doubt about that. Be prepared for
it. Prepare yourself and your children how to fight before you teach them
how to read and write. Freedom has a price and we shall pay that price
however dear it might be.(14) |
Between
January
1953 and July 1954 American statesmen interested in promoting
"stability" in Egypt were concerned primarily with resolving
the Anglo-Egyptian base dispute. They worried that nationalism, provoked
by the impasse with Britain, encouraged Egypt to take a neutral
stance in the Cold War, a dangerous tendency which in her opinion
threatened to open the country to Soviet influence. To resolve the Anglo-Egyptian
dispute, American officials realized that they must press the British to
make substantial concessions, but the degree of pressure they could exert
was limited.
The
Canal Zone base, for example, remained important to Western military
planners even though its strategic value diminished in late 1952.
This change was
mainly due because experience had shown during the riots of 1951 that
the base could not exist against a hostile hinterland, and the United
States wanted the British to retain as many military rights there as
possible.
In
addition, American policy makers wished to preserve the close alliance
between Washington and
London. Thus the desire to satisfy
Egyptian nationalism and halt the tendency toward neutralism conflicted
with the need to maintain American strategic objectives.
To
reconcile these conflicting interests, American officials pursued a compromise
settlement on the issue of base rights that would recognize Egyptian national
aspirations without irreparably damaging Anglo-American relations or forcing
the British to abandon all such rights in Egypt. Tactics such as
mediating Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and offering economic and military
aid to Egypt were devised in an attempt to arrange a compromise,
but these efforts were impeded by British and Egyptian intransigence born
of domestic political concerns.
Only
after the political situations in London and Cairo changed
in early 1954 did American efforts result in the initialing of a
base settlement in July 1954. By that time, American relations with
both Egypt and Britain had been strained by the base dispute.
After
20
January 1953, American policy was decided primarily by President
Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
Generally, Eisenhower allowed Dulles to take the initiative
in conceiving and implementing policy toward Egypt, although he
vetoed Dulles' policy several times during his administration. Eisenhower
and Dulles were assisted by Jefferson Caffery, who remained
at his post of ambassador in Cairo, where his prestige and acclaim
gave him effective powers of persuasion over significant figures in the
Egyptian government. Henry A. Byroade directed the Bureau of Near
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs and was assisted by
Deputy
Director John D. Jernegan
and the officer in charge of Egyptian
affairs, Wells Stabler. Egypt became a central concern of
Secretary
of State Dulles, who deserves credit for directing American policy
toward that country early in the Eisenhower administration.
When
they took office in
January 1953, Eisenhower and Dulles
were confronted by conflicting interests in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.
They were concerned that unsatisfied nationalistic aspirations were leading
the developing world toward a neutral orientation in the Cold War and that
the unresolved Anglo-Egyptian base dispute fomented rampant nationalism
in Egypt.
New
strategic factors reduced the importance of the Canal Zone base
and making possible some degree of British withdrawal from Egypt. Moreover,
Britain and Egypt resolved the Sudan issue that had inhibited
progress toward a base settlement for years. These changes impelled the
American desire to resolve the base dispute, if necessary by eliciting
significant British concessions.
Yet
there were several constraints on the American desire to pressure the British
to concede on the base issue. Although no longer indispensable, base facilities
in the Canal Zone, especially the airfield at Abu Sueir,
were still valuable. For reasons of domestic politics and prestige, British
leaders were stubbornly opposed to granting concessions to Egypt,
and thus excessive American pressure might erode the Anglo-American alliance
and undermine British support of American diplomatic interests in other
areas of the world. During the first half of 1953, American officials
failed to resolve these conflicts. Although they were alarmed by the development
of Egyptian nationalism and neutralism, the value of the Anglo-American
alliance prevented them from pressing the British to make concessions that
might lead to settlement. Instead, they tried to mediate a settlement based
on mutual concessions. But this initiative failed, the base dispute persisted,
and Egypt drifted farther toward neutralism.
Before
Eisenhower's
inauguration, State Department officials warned him that the Anglo-Egyptian
disputes on the base and Sudan issues "threaten stability in
the Near East" by encouraging Egyptian neutralism and thus rendering
it vulnerable to communist influence. They suggested breaking with Britain,
if necessary, to solve these problems. In June, an interdepartmental
commission advised the president that the United States must become
"champion
and defender of genuine independence movements" to shield the developing
world from "pseudo-revolutionary communism." "To tie ourselves
to the tail of the British kite in the Middle East," Deputy Assistant Secretary
Jernegan warned Dulles, "would be to abandon all hope of a peaceful
alignment of that area with the West."
In
July,
NEA
officials advised that the United States"counter the trend toward neutralism"
in
Egypt
and "develop a desire there to cooperate with the West."
The NSC
resolved
i that the United States must "guide the revolutionary and nationalistic
pressures throughout the area into orderly channels not antagonistic toward
the west (15)
Anxious
to arrange settlement of the base dispute, American officials were encouraged
when British strategists decided in December 1952 that the Canal
Zone base, though still
valuable, was no longer indispensable. This conclusion was based in
part on Soviet development of atomic weapons that made it dangerous to
station eighty thousand troops, the number then present in the Canal Zone,
within striking distance of Soviet airfields. Britain had exploded an atomic
device at Monte Bello in October 1952, and its strategists were acutely
aware of the devastating potential of these weapons. Egyptian violence
against the British troops, moreover, rendered the base practically unmanageable
by sapping troop morale, forcing native laborers to quit their service
jobs on the base, and threatening food and water supplies. In November
1952, Nasser had endorsed guerrilla warfare against the British,
telling a journalist that "there will be such terror that . . . it will
become far too expensive for the British to maintain their citizens in
occupation of our country."
One
historian has counted
forty-seven British soldiers killed and 3,297
acts of theft or vandalism against British military property in the Canal
Zone between October 1951 and June 1954. Budgetary constraints
created an additional incentive to station the troops at home bases. British
officials decided to relocate their Middle East base at Cyprus,
deploy most of the troops in Egypt to home bases, and rely on air
mobility to transport troops to any place in the Middle East that
subsequently was threatened by instability or communist aggression. (16)
In
early 1953, American strategic thinking about Egypt also
shifted decisively. When Eisenhower and Dulles took office,
American policy makers still aimed to establish
MEDO as formulated
by Acheson fifteen months earlier. The
NSC resolved in January
that MEDO offered "a means of gaining the political cooperation
of the states of the area and encouraging integrated defense planning."
NEA experts deemed it "essential" that Egypt participate
in this defense organization, and Eisenhower
and British Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden agreed in early March
that MEDO remained
a joint objective. Dulles soon concluded, however, that MEDO
was
poorly conceived, impossible to achieve, and thus undeserving of American
effort. He decided that states north of
Egypt would provide a more
dependable basis for Middle East defense. Since Turkey joined
NATO
in March 1952, Pentagon officials had been considering the
merits of a forward defense along the
Turkish-Iranian Pakistani
frontier, but their ideas remained undeveloped until Dulles
shifted
the State Department's attention to the north in early 1953
.(17)
Dulles
decided to abandon the quest to establish MEDO in Egypt because
it was clear that Egyptian nationalism would prevent it. MEDO was
"completely
unacceptable" to Egypt, Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian ambassador
in Washington, told Byroade.
Farouq's regime had refused
to accept it, and the RCC "cannot afford to appear before the
Egyptian public less intent on achieving Egypt's national aspirations than
previous governments."
Dulles
reached the same conclusion during a three-day visit to Cairo
in May, his first stop on a three-week tour of the Middle East
and South Asia. Upon departing Washington, Dulles
announced that he would "listen intently to what I am told and consider
the problems brought to my attention with the utmost interest and sympathy"
In Cairo,
Naguib, Nasser, and Foreign Minister Mahmoud
Fawzi told him unequivocally that Egypt would not participate
in MEDO until British troops evacuated the Canal Zone. The
Soviets "have never occupied our territory . . . but the British have
been here for seventy years," Nasser told Dulles. "How can
I go to my people and tell them I am disregarding a killer with a pistol
sixty miles from me at the Suez Canal to worry about somebody who is holding
a knife a thousand miles away? They would tell me, 'first things first."'
Any
attempt to thrust MEDO
on the Egyptians, Dulles concluded
after this meeting, "will meet with complete failure .... It is obvious
that MEDO at present does not have a chance." Egyptian leaders "are
intensely nationalistic and do not have any understanding of the international
implications of the Suez base," Dulles told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (SFRC) on 3 June. "The Arab States are not
going to go along with a defense organization which is packed with non-Arab
countries, and particularly with countries they look upon as colonial countries."
(18)
Dulles
had arrived in Cairo believing that Egypt "would be the
key to the development of strength in the Middle East," but his meetings
there convinced him otherwise. American officials must cease their "fixation"
on MEDO, he advised in late May. "We must . . . avoid
becoming fascinated with concepts that have no reality." MEDO "with Egypt
as the key," he told the NSC on 1 June, was "not a
realistic basis for present planning." Egypt was so unstable
and its future so uncertain that the U.S. should concentrate now upon building
a defense in the area based on the northern tier," a point Dulles
pressed on Eisenhower, the Pentagon, and the British during
the summer. "So far as the State Department is concerned," Dulles
announced on 30 July, "MEDO is... 'on the shelf."(19)
By
shelving MEDO and focusing on the northern tier, Dulles removed
Egypt
from consideration as the cornerstone of Middle East defense, a
move that had significant implications for the Anglo-Egyptian base dispute.
Economic and military assistance would be designated to those
Middle
East states "which are most conscious of the Soviet threat and most
disposed to cooperate with Western powers," excluding Egypt.
The United States would bolster Turkey and Pakistan
and "between these two cornerstones . . . develop stability and further
elements of strength wherever conditions make it possible." Egypt
had lost the central strategic importance once ascribed to it, and Dulles
concluded
that satisfying Egyptian nationalism was more important than prolonging
the British occupation of the Canal Zone. (20)
Meanwhile
the British Government, realizing that Nasser meant business and
that in any case so large a concentration was no longer compatible with
the requirements of nuclear strategy, were less adverse to phasing out
what Churchill called "this costly base". And so a curious
compromise was worked out whereby the British army was evacuated leaving
the skeleton base to be run by British civilian contractors.
The
evacuation agreement "Etifaqiyat el galaa" was initialled
on 27 July 1954 and came into force on 19 October 1954.it
brought to bdel Nasser a sudden and soaring prestige through the Middle
East as a man would could get results with the "Imperialists".
"Lift up your
heads, oh citizen, for the days of oppression are over!' was the slogan
displayed on posters throughout all the streets of Cairo to celebrate the
evacuation agreement."
From
this moment onwards Gamal Abdel Nasser became a hero in the eyes
of most Arab nationalists, his picture appearing in shops and coffeehouses
from Baghdad to
Rabat . The agreement had crucial and perhaps
predictable results.
The
power void which had been created in the Western defense system in the
Middle
East was replaced by the American-inspired Bagdad Pact - the
"Northern
tier" which seemed such a splendid idea to John Foster Dulles
but which was worse than anathema to Nasser and indeed all other
progressive nationalists in the Middle East, who were utterly opposed
to Nuri-es-Said's power shift to Baghdad, or indeed to any
alliance between the Arabs and the West. By the same token, it cleared
the ground for Russia against whom the Baghdad pact was principally
directed - to jump the cordon and begin flirting with
Egypt for
her own account. And it brought apprehension to Israel, whose
Prime
Minister described the evacuation as an "abandonment of Israel to
her fate".
An
impressive stream of V I P's now began to flock to Cairo
to pay their respects to the new ruler of Egypt. Tito of
Yugoslavia
came
and gave some interesting advice on the benefits of centralization and
the evils of private enterprise. Ten days later,
Nehru of India
gave some useful tips on how to play off the
East against the West.
He was followed by Sukarno of Indonesia. Another brief
visitor was Anthony Eden, whose attitude towards the President
was (in Nasser's words)
"that he was talking to a junior official
who could not be expected to understand international politics".
A few
days later, in April 1955, Gamal Abdel Nasser stepped into
an Air India plane at Cairo International airport and took
off on his first trip outside the Arab world. Twenty-nine nations
were represented at the
Bandung Conference - monarchies, feudal
states, republics, communists and anti-communists - of every political
persuasion, but all with certain things in common almost all of them had
been under colonial domination, all were fired with the intoxicant of nationalism,
and most of them were neutralists (which in those days meant, practically
by definition, antiWest).
For
Nasser,
the youngest of the delegates and the only one to appear in uniform, Bandung
was an experience of immense significance. He was loudly cheered and made
much of by a number of envoys, and in particular by Chou En-Lai
who went out of his way to win Egypt's friendship, all of which
brought home to him that Egypt was a power in the resurgent
East
- the "Third Block", neither capitalist nor communist, which nevertheless
represented five-eighths of the world's population. He returned
to Cairo with much more of a global outlook, having established
for himself a position as one of the Big Four in the
Afro-Asian
world, a fact that did not go unnoticed either in Beijing or
Moscow:
Yet
in a different direction a whole sequence of misunderstandings, mistrusts,
and disagreements was developing, which was rapidly to turn the Middle
East into a ferment and culminate into events of historic proportions.
(To be continued)
(4) Elizabeth
Monroe, op. cit., p. 175. See also The Times, 5 March 1953.
(5)Mideast
Mirror, 14 February 1953, p. 4 ; New York Times, February 1953.
(6)Al-Ahram,
15 February 1953 ; The Daily Telegraph, 16 February 1953
(7)
The New York Times of 27 February was in fact referring to a statement
made by Gamal Abdel Nasser to a Correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune
in the mid-November 1952. The statement as reproduced by Al-Akhbar on 29
December 1952 was as follows :
| «We
are quite prepared to.be reasonable. The British have promised us during
the past 70 years to evacuate the Canal Zone but are still there. Egypt
will no longer tolerate procrastination and dilatory methodea."
-If
the Government of the new regime has reason to believe, after its sincere
efforts, that Egypt's liberation from the British occupation is not in
sight, I assure you that the military leaders will relinquish their official
position to lead the people in a struggle against the British. This will
not be an officially declared war but it will rather have the character
of strong resistance movement in which guerrilla methods will be adopted.
Hand-grenades will be thrown in the dark. British troops will be assassinated
in the streets and the struggle will be undertaken by Commanders who will
make the British pay a high price for the occupation o£ our country,"
(Mideast Mirror, 3 January 1953, p. 5). |
On
3 January, Fathy Radwan, the Minister of State, repeated the threat uttered
by Gamal Abdel Nasser, cited above, and on the next day Major Abdel Hakim
Amer asserted the Government's primary aim of driving the British out of
Egypt and the Sudan. General Naguib also told a large group of students
that the revolution had been staged in order to expel imperialists. Major
Salah Salim threatened the British of drastic action, including sabotage
and boycotting even if Great Britain were involved in a great war'.
(8)
Al-Ahram.
10 and 11 March 1953; Mideast Mirror, 14 March 1953, p2
(9)
The
Times, 6 February 1953; for references see Survey 1953, pp. 162-63.
(10)
New
York Times, 27 February 1953.
(11)
John
Marlowe, op. cit., p. 398. ; The times , 19 march 1953
(12)
Mideast Mirror, 28 March 1953, p. 1.
(13)
Ibid., p. 5.
(14)The
Egyptian Gazette, 1 April 1953; also Mideast Mirror, 4 April 1953,
pp. 6-7.
(15)State
Department briefing paper for Eisenhower, 2 Jan. 1953, and report by the
President's Committee on International Activities, 3 June 1953, FRUS, 1952-
1954,
5:1929-31 and 2:1795-1874; jernegan to Dulles, 17 June 1953, RG 59,
611.41;
and NSC 155/1, 14 July 1953, RG 273.
(16)Nasser
quoted in Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, p. 173.
(17)NSC
141, 19 Jan. 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 2:209-22; and Dulles to Caffery, 23
Jan. 1953, RG 59, 780.5. See also Matthews to Lovett, 15 Aug. 1952, RG
59, 780.5; JCS to Lovett, 17 Oct. 1952, RG 330, CD 092/Middle East) 1952;
Caffery to Acheson, 1 Jan. 1953, RG 59, 774.5; NIE 76, 15 Jan. 1953, FRUS,
1952-1954, 9:334-43; memorandum of conversation by Dulles, 4 Mar. 1953,
RG 59, 611.41; and Poole, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pp.
370-74.
(18)Nasser
quoted in Heikal, Cairo Documents, pp. 40-41; Dulles to Smith, 13 May 1953,
RG 59, 641.74; and Dulles testimony, 3 June 1953, U.S. Congress, Senate,
Executive Sessions, pp. 441, 453. Heikal published a different version
of the Nasser-Dulles exchange in Cutting the Lion's Tail, pp. 39-40.
(19)
Memorandum
of discussion, 1 June 1953, Whitman File: NSC Series, box 4; memorandum
by Dulles, "Conclusions on Rip," n.d. [May 1953], Dulles Papers, box 73;
and circular telegram by Dulles, 30 July 1953, RG 59, 780.5. See also NSC
action summary 801, 1 June 1953, RG 273; memorandum of conversation by
McGhee, 28 May 1953, McGhee Papers, box 1; memorandum of discussion, 9
July 1953, Whitman File: NSC Series, box 4; memorandum of conversation
by William Baxter, 8 June 1953, Dulles to Caffery, 11 June 1953, memorandum
of conversation by Jernegan, 17 June 1953, Dulles to Wilson, 26 June 1953,
and Wilson to Dulles with attachments, 26 Aug. 1953, RG 59, 780.5; JCS
to Wilson, 11 Aug. 1953, RG 218, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47), section 15;
and British record of meeting, I1 July 1953, FO 371/102732, JE10345/27.
(20)
Circular
telegram by Dulles, 30 July 1953, RG 59, 780.5; and NSC 162, 30 Sept. 1953,
FRUS, 1952-1954, 2:489-514. See also NSC 162/2, 30 Oct. 1953, ibid., pp.
577-97; Smith to Wilson, 12 Nov. 1953, and Wilson to Dulles, 24 Nov. 1953,
RG 59, 780.5; and JCS to Wilson, 14 Nov. 1953, RG 218, CCS 381 EMMEA /11-19-47[,
section 16.
|
