| By
exposing glaring weaknesses in Egypt's military capabilities, the
Gaza
raid
sharply stung Gamal Abdel Nasser, threatened his command
of Egypt, and vaulted him toward a policy of neutralism in the Cold
War. Egyptian army officers pressured him to acquire modern weapons
and improve the armed forces so as to prevent additional debacles. Abdel
Nasser concluded that unless he countered it with some bold initiative,
his leadership of Egypt and of the Arab world would crumble.
"Nasser
cannot take another Gaza-like attack by the Israelis lying down,"Henry
A. Byroade, who succeeded Caffery as ambassador to
Cairo
in February 1955 , observed "without seriously jeopardizing his
leadership in Egypt. (1)
Dulles
was alarmed by the Gaza raid and Gamal Abdel Nasser's attendance
at the
Bandung
conference because they coincided with what he believed
a new Soviet and Communist Chinese initiatives to gain influence in developing
states. In April 1955, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced
a new policy of extending economic assistance to such countries "least
for economic reasons and most for political purposes." Cold War tensions
in Europe diminished in 1954 and early 1955, but Dulles
feared that this development would merely shift the East-West contest to
the Middle East and East Asia. Chinese-Egyptian contacts
at the conference at Bandung added to American concern. (2)
In
light of these developments, Dulles accelerated his effort to advance
Alpha.
In early April, he instructed Henry Byroade to divulge the
plan secretly to Abdel Nasser in hope of gaining Egyptian
support. But Abdel Nasser after the
Bandung
Conference was unwilling to consider it. Byroade and British
Ambassador to Cairo Ralph Stevenson agreed on
20 May
that Alpha was "clearly impossible for the time being." "In
the present state of tension at Gaza," Byroade noted on 9
June, "we cannot expect serious talks regarding Alpha. (3)
Given
Abdel
Nasser's non-cooperation, in early June Dulles decided,
over the objections of his aides and the British, to publicize the Alpha
peace plan. Publication of the Alpha plan would "appeal to the
good
judgment of all concerned," he argued, and "world opinion . . .
should rally to its support." Secret negotiations would take too much
time. "If any success is to be achieved it must be this year, as the
whole subject of Israel-Arab relations will be a political football in
1956 . . . . If the Department does not have an established position
on the Israeli-Arab issue by the end of this year, both political parties
will take extreme positions in the elections of 1956, which would
result in the loss of the Arab world to the West." Dulles also
feared that Soviet aid to the Arab states, predicted by intelligence
reports in the summer of
1955, would force the United States
"to
back Israel much more strongly and drop our role of impartiality. If
"Alpha" is to be done at all," he told Eisenhower, "it
should be done while we can speak as the friend of both." Dulles
publicized
Alpha on 26 August, suggesting a settlement that
included large-scale international financial assistance to compensate and
relocate Palestinian refugees; permanent demarcation of Arab-Israeli boundaries;
an agreement sponsored by the United Nations, the United States,
and other powers that guaranteed collective security against aggression
by either side; and United Nations settlement of the problem of
sovereignty of Jerusalem. Initial replies from the Arab states
and Israel encouraged Dulles
and Eisenhower
that the
plan might work. (4)
Despite
Dulles's optimism, the Alpha plan was immediately hobbled by
violence along the Egyptian-Israeli border in Gaza. Between March
and June, Egyptian and Israeli soldiers repeatedly exchanged mortar
and rifle fire despite American and United Nations efforts to negotiate
a truce. After three Egyptian soldiers perished in a firefight on 22
August, Gamal Abdel Nasser terminated United
Nations truce talks and ordered a massive assault against Israeli positions
on 25 August, the eve of Dulles's Alpha address. British
and American intelligence detected Abdel Nasser's preparations,
and at the risk of compromising local sources an officer at the American
embassy in Cairo appealed directly to Abdel Nasser
to cancel the attack. Gamal agreed, but not before commando units
out of radio contact crossed into Israel and killed several Israelis.
Ignoring American pressure not to retaliate, the Israeli army attacked
Khan
Yunis on 31 August, killing
thirty soldiers
and
Palestinian
refugees. Only after the United Nations Security Council
passed
a cease-fire resolution on 8 September did relative calm return
to the border area. (5)
Alpha
suffered another major setback in September when Gamal Abdel
Nasser
purchased a large quantity of Soviet weapons through Czechoslovakia
after
Western powers refused his requests for arms. Under political fire after
the Gaza raid, Gamal Abdel Nasser asked the United States
and
Britain
to provide grant military assistance, stating his preference for Western
weapons because his forces were accustomed to them. Ambassador Byroade
endorsed Gamal's requests to acquire $28 million
worth of
B-26
warplanes, medium tanks, and other equipment, warning that the Soviets
were preparing to make similar weapons available.
"The West must
meet, or better, the Soviet offer of arms and assistance," Byroade
cautioned,
"or Nasser will either be overthrown or forced to accept the Soviet
offer." Dulles and British policy makers initially dismissed this
assessment. At the Geneva summit in July 1955,
Khrushchev
assured
Dulles that the Soviets were not contemplating an arms deal with
Egypt,  convincing
Assistant Secretary Allen that "Soviet aid is out of the
question:" Therefore Dulles decided against granting arms to
Egypt for fear that doing so would spark an Egyptian-Israeli arms race,
destroy Alpha, and possibly result in regional war. He and
Eisenhower
offered to sell Egypt $11 million worth of equipment as part of
a "concerted effort to 'woo' Nasser." Even after the CIA warned
in late August that the prospective Soviet arms aid was consistent
with Moscow's political aims and within its capabilities, Dulles
refrained from granting weapons to Abdel Nasser. (6)
British
officials also refused to supply the weapons Abdel Nasser
desired. In early 1955, they released sixteen Centurion tanks,
purchased by Farouq in 1950 but never delivered because of
the base dispute. Anxious to avoid an Arab-Israeli arms race however,
the Eden government withheld other tanks and planes that Egypt
had partially paid for in 1950 and agreed to sell only meager amounts
of military equipment in 1955. "Since Egypt was not cooperating
with us over defense matters," Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh observed on 20
September, "the normal justification for the offer would be lacking.
(7)
Byroade's
warning of a prospective Egyptian-Soviet arms deal proved to be prescient.
Frustrated by his unfulfilled requests to Western powers, Gamal
Abdel Nasser opened talks with Dmitri Shepilov, editor
of Tass and future foreign minister, in July. On 19 September,
American intelligence learned that Egypt and Czechoslovakia
would imminently conclude an arms deal. Dulles
tried to reverse the deal by rushing Kermit Roosevelt
of the CIA
and Assistant Secretary Allen to Cairo to press Nasser
not to ratify it, but Abdel Nasser refused their appeals.
The
deal was "now an accomplished fact and would not be changed," he argued.
It had solidified his support in the Egyptian army, and signaled to other
Arabs that he had achieved true independence from Western imperialism.
So
popular was the deal among Arabs that even Iraqi Premier Nuri Said
felt compelled to endorse it." (8)
American
and British officials judged the deal "a very serious" setback for
Western interests in the Middle East. The arms deal was a "source
of deep anxiety," Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan wrote,
because it signaled the "opening of a new Soviet offensive in the Middle
East." Soviet influence had leaped the northern tier shield and landed
in the heart of the region. "A foothold of this kind in Egypt;' Francis
Russell observed, "would lead to a grave threat to the ultimate
security of the Suez Canal .... Similar penetration of other Arab states
would be hard to prevent."
According to American
intelligence reports, moreover, Egypt would acquire, at half price,
two hundred MIG-15 jet fighters, six trainer jets, twenty-five
medium bombers, one to two hundred Stalin tanks, eight
naval vessels, six submarines, and shipload after shipload
of smaller materiel giving it a substantial advantage over Israel in tactical
strength (9).
Thus the deal might set off an Israeli-Egyptian arms race or even impel
the Israelis to attack Egypt within a few months, before the weapons
reached Egyptian hands." (10)
Macmillan
and Dulles consulted on how to respond to the deal. They "got
more and more worked up against the prospects of a Soviet arms deal with
Egypt," Pinhas Lavon noted. "The thought of Soviet technicians
sitting on the airfields which we built, and to which we would have to
return in an emergency under the Treaty, was too much for Macmillan, and
Dulles could not bear the Egyptian ingratitude for all the money the US
had spent on her." Macmillan suggested "a very stiff and
almost threatening protest to Nasser. We cannot really allow this
man . . . to destroy our base and threaten our rear." Dulles
agreed
that if Abdel Nasser ratified the deal, "we may have to start
getting tough around there." But he and Macmillan realized that
"any threatening or drastic step" would drive Abdel Nasser further
toward alignment with the Soviets and thus agreed to "insulate the present
incident" while leaving Abdel Nasser "in the greatest possible
doubt" regarding the Western reaction. "Our inclination;" Macmillan
told Dulles, "is to move on with the policy of the mild squeeze
on
Egypt and strengthening the Northern Pact pretty rapidly" Eden agreed that
the deal was "understandable if regrettable."
el_homosany@yahoo.com
© el-Homosany 2003
|
