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restore their influence in Egypt in the wake of the Soviet arms
deal, and prevent additional Soviet influence from seeping to the country,
American and British officials decided to finance construction of a new
high
dam at Aswan. Already experts from Electricité
de France had been commissioned to prepare a twenty-year
electrification program for the country. On September 24 Egypt asked
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a
loan intended to finance the construction of the High Dam. On November
6 an economic agreement was signed between the two countries; it provided
for a grant of $40 million to finance certain projects for irrigation
and for railroad and highway construction. Somewhat earlier a French
banking mission, led by the president of the Comptoir National d'Escompte
de Paris, had arrived in Cairo (on June 5) to study French
participation in the construction of the High Dam; it recognized
that this project, in spite of its magnitude, "was not disproportionate
to the economic possibilities of Egypt,"30 and it sent a task
force of engineers to the site. Finally, on November 27, the government
turned to Egyptian capital: it issued three internal loans amounting to
£E.
25 million. In 1955-56
the government was to issue new internal
loans amounting to £E. 54.2
and
£E. 25 million.
Moreover
underSecretary
of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., noted that there was "ample evidence
that the Egyptians will proceed with construction by the Russians"
in the absence of Western aid, a move that "would have extremely serious
repercussions on US national security interests in the Middle East and
North Africa." "This dam is going to be built," Hoover informed
the SFRC, "whether we build it or whether the Russians build it."
The State Department, NSC, and CIA supported extending
American aid for the dam. Within the administration, only Secretary
of the Treasury George M. Humphrey opposed the plan, arguing that it
would drain American foreign aid funds. Aid for Aswan "is a cheap
price to pay," Dulles countered, "for peace and progress." Eden
agreed
with Dulles. The "prospect of several hundred Soviet engineers
established on the Upper Nile;" he believed, "would certainly give
ground for alarm." The outlook for Africa would then be grave indeed."
"The dam will last for generations and be an outstanding symbol of benefit
to the people," Macmillan added. "If we build it, it will help our
position. Otherwise, the Kremlin will capitalize on it.." (1)
Eugene
Black, president of the World Bank and since 1954
one of the dam's most enthusiastic supporters, organized discussions between
the bank, the United States, Britain, and Egypt to arrange
terms for financing the dam. On 16 December, the United States
and Britain offered to underwrite construction of the new dam. Of
the total cost of $1.3 billion, Egypt needed $400 million
in foreign currency. Of the latter amount, the World Bank offered
to lend Egypt half, and Britain and the United States agreed
to grant the other half. They committed themselves to provide $70 million
($56.4 million from the United States and $13.6 million from Britain/ to
pay for the initial stage of construction and to consider sympathetically
subsequent requests for the remaining $130 million. Although these
terms did not fully please Abdel Nasser, they provided a basis for
negotiation.
Dulles
secured preliminary, unofficial approval from
Democrats in Congress to offer the aid, and Black departed for Cairo
in
January to negotiate a deal with Abdel Nasser.
(2)
In
early 1956, American-Egyptian relations worsened considerably. The
American offer of economic assistance for the Aswan dam failed to
influence Abdel Nasser. He obstructed the Alpha
peace
plan, assaulted the Baghdad Pact, stirred Arab nationalism against
Western interests, and practiced positive neutralism. Dulles
and
Eisenhower
deemed these developments dangerous because they opened the Middle East
to Soviet influence and raised the possibility that Abdel Nasser
might
exploit the East-West contest for personal benefit. They tired of
Abdel Nasser's independent posture and decided in March to force
him to choose between alignment with or isolation from the
West.
When Abdel Nasser failed to respond favorably, the Americans
and British agreed to withdraw their offers of economic assistance for
the Aswan dam. For domestic political reasons,
Dulles canceled
his offer abruptly, insulting Abdel Nasser and provoking him to
take defiant action that created a crisis in Anglo-American and Anglo-Egyptian
relations.
The
Czech arms deal impeded the Alpha plan by exciting Israeli fears
that Soviet weapons would give Egypt military superiority and encourage
Arab aggressiveness. In Israel, talk surfaced of attacking Egypt
before it attained an advantage. Abdel Nasser had become
"a menace to Israel's survival;" Ambassador to Washington Abba
Eban warned on 11 October. David Ben Gurion, known for
his hawkish posture toward the Arabs, returned as prime minister on 3
November, and tension increased along the border in Gaza. Eisenhower
and
Eden publicly reaffirmed the Alpha peace terms in November.
To settle the dispute over the Naqab, deemed the greatest obstacle
to Egyptian-Israeli peace, Dulles suggested the "converging triangles"
plan,
which would designate to Egypt and Jordan triangular pieces
of territory in the Naqab, positioned point to point and connected
by a highway that would bridge Israel's roadway between Eilat
and Beersheba. Abdel Nasser showed no interest in Alpha.
Israel's insecurity mounted when Dulles and Eisenhower refused
to guarantee its security or sell it weapons to counterbalance the arms
acquired ; by Abdel Nasser. Dulles feared that
either step would undermine
Alpha. To guard traditional markets
in Israel
and
Egypt,
Britain released "a trickle"
of defensive weapons to both powers in early
December 1955 but days
later suspended the shipments following an Israeli raid at Lake Tiberias,
in which
fifty-six Syrians were slaughtered." (3)
In
early 1956, Eisenhower and Dulles decided to send
former Under Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson to Cairo
and Tel Aviv to have the "frankest kind of talks"
with Abdel Nasser and Ben Gurion regarding Alpha.
In December, covert American officers had secured assurances from
both Abdel Nasser and Ben Gurion that they would
talk seriously with such an intermediary.
Anderson shuttled
between Cairo and Tel Aviv in January and
March
1956
to discourage both leaders from hostilities and to get Alpha
off
the ground. (4)
The
dispute over the Naqab was Anderson's greatest problem.
Israel offered to grant air and rail transit rights between Egypt
and Jordan and Lebanon but refused to "cede territory,
whether populated or unpopulated, in the Negev (Naqab)." Abdel Nasser
demanded "a satisfactorily substantial territory connecting Egypt and
Jordan and forming a part of one or the other of these two states."
To entice the two powers to accept the "converging triangles" plan
as a compromise,
Anderson pledged that the United States
would guarantee the security of the borders in the arrangement, but both
sides remained cold to the idea. Ben Gurion warned that he would
resist militarily any attempt to force
Israel
to relinquish territory.
Abdel
Nasser viewed the plan as too elaborate, exotic, and impractical, and
he privately derided it. "Suppose an Arab was on the overpass one day
and felt the call of nature and it landed on an Israeli car on the underpass;"
Abdel Nasser explained to his aides.
"There would be war!" The
State
Department considered other potential compromises, such as making the
Naqab
an "autonomous, bi-national region under U.N. trusteeship," arranging
a trade of the Nagab for
Gaza, and even building a causeway
across the Gulf of Aqaba linking Egypt and Jordan.
None of these plans was accepted. (5)
Anderson
also
failed to settle the status of the I million Palestinian refugees
living in Egypt and Jordan. Abdel Nasser
insisted that they be given a choice between repatriation to Israel
or compensation for their lost property. Anderson endorsed this
demand provided that ceilings were placed on how many could choose repatriation,
and he offered generous compensation to resettle them elsewhere. But Ben
Gurion
refused to accept any refugees, and Palestinian leaders
rejected the idea of permanent resettlement outside their homeland, even
at American expense. (6)
Anderson
failed
even to build a foundation for productive Israeli-Egyptian peace talks.
Ben
Gurion refused to recognize him as an official intermediary and insisted
on direct negotiations with Abdel Nasser, first at
the staff level and then at the top level. Direct talks would be a "token
of good will by Nasser," Sharett explained. "Otherwise .
. . the Israeli Government would be suspicious that Nasser will be misleading
the President Eisenhower and the Israelis . . . into a sense of false assurance."
But Abdel Nasser rejected such an encounter To
meet Ben Gurion, he argued, would be to commit "political suicide
or worse.'
Anderson offered to arrange a top secret meeting
aboard a United States aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean, but Abdel
Nasser
still objected, arguing that news of the meeting would certainly
reach the public.AbdelNasser also refused Anderson's suggestion
to meet an American Jew acting as Ben Gurion's emissary
Abdel
Nasser and Ben Gurion also disagreed on the timing of a prospective
settlement. Israel insisted on an immediate settlement before Egypt
would deploy the Czech arms. (7)
Although
Anderson
negotiated tentative agreements on several minor disputes, his mission
failed in early March, when Abdel Nasser for the first time
refused to sponsor a settlement with Israel and insisted that any
agreement he reached with Anderson must be publicized as a Western proposal
for the joint consideration of Egypt and other Arab states. Abdel
Nasser's position made Anderson's handiwork a starting point
for Arab-Israeli talks rather than a settlement. Thereafter, Anderson lost
his momentum and Egypt and Israel drifted away from negotiations,
blaming each other for the deadlock. Anderson's experience convinced
Eisenhower
that
the Middle East "is a very sorry situation .... The chances of
a peaceful settlement seem remote." State Department
personnel explored
new approaches to the objective of Arab-Israeli peace.
(8)
During
the Anderson mission, Eisenhower and Dulles became
fearful that incidents along the border in Gaza might escalate into
war. Egyptian and Palestinian fedayeen commandos regularly conducted sabotage
and sniping raids across the border, and Israeli troops routinely retaliated.
This instability, Dulles told the cabinet, created "the most
difficult situation in the Near East up to this point." Encouraged
by Eden, Eisenhower reaffirmed the tripartite declaration
of 1950, publicly announcing his determination "to support and assist
any Middle East nation which might be subjected to . . . aggression."
He also privately cautioned Abdel Nasser to "avoid retaliatory
action which could have the gravest consequences," directed American
military officers to join their British and French counterparts in designing
contingency plans for countering aggression within the Middle East,
refused Israeli requests for arms, and sent a small naval force to the
eastern
Mediterranean as a sign of his determination to oppose aggression.
Aboard those ships he stockpiled "arms in escrow;" defensive weapons
to be delivered to any victim of aggression in the area. (9)
In
addition to the tension along the borders of Israel, there was the
problem of Egyptian opposition to the Baghdad Pact. After Turkey
and
Iraq created the pact in February 1955, Britain acceded to it
in April, followed by Pakistan in September and Iran
in
October.
The British joined to close the gap between NATO and SEATO,
preserve their military rights at Iraqi airfields that were due to expire
in 1957, and demonstrate to backbenchers their determination to
maintain British influence in the Middle East. They signed on under
the impression that the United States would do likewise, but Dulles
and Eisenhower decided not to join formally to avoid angering Egypt
and Israel and undermining
Alpha. Dulles merely sent
word to Middle East governments that "we support, encourage,
and welcome" the pact, and the Pentagon assigned an observer
to its meetings. Anxious to assume leadership of a united Arab world, Abdel
Nasser
denounced Iraqi participation in the pact and released a stream
of propaganda designed to prevent any other Arab power from breaking ranks
with him by following
Iraq's lead. In late 1955, encouraged
by the prospect of Western aid for the Aswan dam, he offered to
suspend the propaganda on the condition that no effort would be made to
enlist the United States or any other Arab state in it. Ambassador
Byroade agreed, provided Abdel Nasser cooperated closely with
Alpha.
"An immediate move to expand the Baghdad Pact would probably
deny us Nasser's cooperation" in Alpha, Dulles advised Macmillan on 5 December.
"I think we should wait a little before trying to bring in Jordan." (10)
Eden
rejected this advice. "The stronger the Northern Tier," he believed,
"the better Nasser will behave." Eden dispatched CIGS Gerald Tempter
to Amman in early December to convince Jordan's King Hussein
to
join the pact. Tempter offered the king enough aid to double the
size of the Arab Legion, and Iraq extended 1.3 million
pounds sterling in aid. Nationalistic young Jordanian army officers opposed
membership in the pact, however, and riots against the king and the British
threatened a revolution against Hussein, forcing him to refuse Tempter's
offers. Afterward, Dulles and Eisenhower tried to restore
the broken understanding with Abdel Nasser, but he refused.
Having nearly lost Jordan to Iraq's influence, Abdel Nasser
would no longer rest in his rivalry with Nuri for leadership of
the Arab states. Assuming a new position of prominence in the Arab world,
Abdel
Nasser branded the pact the newest form of Western imperialism in the
Middle
East. It was "a political ideology designed to isolate Egypt,"
he charged on 19 January. "One by one, nations in the Arab world would
be brought into the Baghdad Pact until finally Egypt would be left alone
to confront the Israelis." Dulles concluded that the Tempter
debacle constituted a "most serious blow to the British prestige in
that part of the world." "We have lost the first round" to Egypt,
Macmillan noted in his diary on 12 January 1956. "However,
the game is not over yet; and we have got to win .... For if we lose in
the Middle East .... we cannot live. (11)
American
and British officials continued to support the Baghdad Pact despite
Abdel
Nasser's campaign against it. In February, the United States
upgraded the status of its representative to the pact from observer to
informal liaison, and three months later American officers were assigned
to two of the pact's planning committees. To counter Abdel Nasser's
propaganda attacks, Eisenhower seriously considered joining the
pact as Eden urged.
Dulles convinced him, however, that Congress
would not ratify membership and that it would make the United States seem
no longer impartial in intra-regional disputes. Moreover, as the Operations
Coordinating Board (OCB) explained, American accession to the pact
"might also attract further Soviet designs and intrigues." To Eden's
dismay, the United States remained officially unattached. "We must show
no lack of resolution in our support of the Baghdad Pact," he declared
to the cabinet. "If it collapsed, there would be nothing to prevent
Soviet influence from reaching down to the Persian Gulf (12)
The
conflict over the Baghdad Pact convinced the British that Nasser
posed a danger to them. They blamed Egyptian radio propaganda for the unrest
in Jordan, which persisted until Hussein dismissed Lieutenant-General
John Bagot Glubb, a British national who had commanded the Arab Legion
since 1939, on 1 March. They also detected Nasser's
influence in anti-British riots in Bahrein, a surge of anti-Westernism
in
Syria, and a plot to overthrow the pro-Western government in
Libya.
Eden
did "not know how long we could go along with Nasser," he told
Dulles
on 30 January. Abdel Nasser's "relations with the Soviets are
much closer than he admits;" he explained to Eisenhower on 5
March. "We can no longer safely wait on Nasser... A policy
of appeasement will bring us nothing in Egypt." "The growing influence
of Egypt,"
Eden advised the cabinet, was now "the main threat"
to
British interests in the
Middle East. After witnessing firsthand
the anti-British riots in
Bahrein, Foreign Secretary Lloyd declared
that "I do not see how we can tolerate [Egyptian] behavior much longer.
(13)
American
officials conditionally agreed with these British assessments. Abdel
Nasser's anti-British attacks weakened the Baghdad Pact and
eroded British prestige in Jordan, and his stubbornness impeded
Alpha.
Under
Secretary Hoover branded him "a progressively increasing menace"
to Western interests. "It is of course true that some of the moves made
by Abdel Nasser, though for different reasons, have the effect
of assisting the Soviets," Eisenhower wrote to Eden in early
March, showing some restraint. "It may well be that we shall be
driven to conclude that it is impossible to do business I with Nasser.
However, I do not think that we should close the door yet on the possibility
of working with him." Eisenhower decided to attempt to isolate
Abdel Nasser from other Arab leaders, such as Saudi Arabian King
Saud, to whom the United States extended military aid in May
1956. "I am certain of one thing," Eisenhower confided to his
diary. "If Egypt finds herself thus isolated from the rest of the Arab
world, and with no ally in sight except Soviet Russia, she would very quickly
get sick of that prospect and would join us in the search for a just and
decent peace in that region." (14)
Soon
after identifying Abdel Nasser as a threat, British
officials initiated a policy to limit his influence. They decided to grant
economic aid to friendly Arab states, strengthen the Baghdad
Pact, separate Egypt and Saudi Arabia, bolster the government
of
Libya, seek to establish a more friendly regime in Syria,
and counter Egyptian propaganda throughout the region. The British would
continue negotiations on economic and military aid as a means of "keeping
Nasser guessing" about their ultimate intentions .
(15)
Dulles
and Eisenhower also reversed their policy toward Egypt in
late March. Friendly incentives had failed to control Abdel Nasser's
behavior or stem the growth of Egyptian neutralism. After hearing a report
from
Anderson, Eisenhower concluded that Abdel Nasser "proved
to be a complete stumbling block" to peace. Soviet weapons were arriving
in Egyptian ports; Abdel Nasser announced that Soviet technicians
would launch an Egyptian atomic research program; and Egyptian-Chinese
commercial ties were growing. 
Abdel Nasser sought military alliances with Syria and Saudi
Arabia to counter the Baghdad Pact and attacked the West in
radio broadcasts. "There seems little likelihood that the U.S. will
be able to work with Nasser in the foreseeable future," NE Director
Fraser Wilkins observed on 14 March. "The U.S. will therefore
have to consider other means for obtaining U.S. objectives in the Near
East." Dulles advised that the United States suspend consideration
of providing aid to Egypt, including that for the Aswan dam; finance
Iraqi propaganda against Abdel Nasser's drive for Arab preeminence;
support Arab powers suspicious of Abdel Nasser and court those
closely allied to him; and bolster the
Baghdad Pact without adhering
to it. Dulles explained that this new initiative, code-named
Omega, would "let Colonel Nasser realize that he cannot cooperate
as he is doing with the Soviet Union and at the same time enjoy most-favored-nation
treatment from the United States. We would want for the time being to avoid
any open break which would throw Nasser irrevocably into a Soviet satellite
status and we would want to leave Nasser a bridge back to good relations
with the West if he so desires." Eisenhower and top State and Defense
Department policy makers approved the Omega initiative on 28
March. (16)
Meanwhile,
the British explored the possibility of deposing Abdel Nasser
through covert action. "We could make life impossible for Nasser," Macmillan
had
told Dulles in the aftermath of the Czech deal, "and ultimately
bring about his fall by various pressures." If Nasser "seems
to be letting the Russians in too far," Foreign Office experts had
advised in January, Britain should seek to replace him with
a new leader. After the dismissal of General Glubb on March,
Eden
told Shuckburgh that he wanted "to strike some blow, somewhere,
to counterbalance," and following the anti-British riots in Bahrein
two
days later, Shuckburgh found the prime minister "now violently
anti-Nasser." In a 12 March meeting with Foreign Office personnel,
an ill-tempered Eden appeared "quite emphatic that Nasser must
be got rid of." "It is either him or us," Eden told his advisers,
"don't forget that."
The next day, Shuckburgh commented privately
that "we are working ourselves up against Nasser and deciding that the
time has come to overthrow him (if we can/ or isolate him." Meanwhile,
Minister of State Anthony Nutting sent Eden a plan for limiting Nasser's
influence by political means. "What's all this nonsense about isolating
Nasser,"Eden replied, according to Nutting's memoirs, published
in
1967.
"I want him destroyed, can't you understand? I want
him removed." In
1984,
Nutting
stated that rather than
"destroyed,"
Eden had said
"murdered," a word
Nutting dared not publish
in
1967 (17)
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