1) On two occasions during 1952-53 Jawaharlal Nehru visited the Egyptian leaders in search of guidance. At the end of the second visit an Egyptian spokesman indicated that "it is possible that Egypt may ally herself with the neutralist bloc of Asian nations in order to try to put an end to the imperialist occupation of the Suez Canal Zone by Great Britain."

(2)  Flower, Napoleon to Nasser, pp. 195-96; and Nutting, Nasser, pp. 91-100, 105-6.

(3) An unsigned pamphlet published by the Information Service made a retrospective catalogue of the basic characteristics of positive neutralism:
 

"( 1 ) First of all, and to the finish, to safeguard national independence against imperialist aggression in an international situation in which national government and a refusal to barter away independence have been brought within the realm of the possible. In other words, this is a practical battle against imperialism in order to eliminate it from all parts of the world, to free national economies from any foreign influence, rejecting foreign alliances, denouncing imperialism at home and abroad, and supporting national movements in countries which have not won independence or in which independence is threatened.

"( 2 ) . . . Solidarity . . . It is inevitable that the states professing positive neutralism should seek allies in order to bring about the collapse of imperialist plans for aggression from without and conspiracies within, to establish economic blockades and to gain assistance in the industrialization of their countries and in their economic development in order to consolidate their national independence. These allies are represented by the other countries in Asia and Africa that profess positive neutralism and are ready to assist one another in confronting imperialism and its crimes. But they are represented also by the socialist countries as the parties most interested in the preservation of peace, an essential condition for the consolidation and development of their economies. This fusion of the common interests of the socialist countries and of the nationalist countries in Asia and Africa creates the possibilities for economic assistance to be furnished by the former to the latter without political conditions . . .

"(3) . . . an independent attitude on international problems . . . , not necessarily a third position, which in no way means passivity . . . ; our attitude is dictated by the national interests of our country and by the interests of peace.

"(4) Once the positive idea has been accepted, it becomes obvious that for us there can be no question of neutrality in the struggle under way between imperialism and the peoples striving to preserve their independence, in the world struggle for world peace . . .

"(5) Positive neutralism does not confuse friend with foe, nor does it put them on equal footing in its evaluation of them and dealings with them . . "

(4) July 1954: Israeli intelligence planted "a ring of spies (moles)" in Cairo. Its task was to begin sabotage operations against selected Egyptian, British and American targets. On July 14, the Alexandria post office was fire-bombed, and the U.S. Information Agency offices in Cairo and Alexandria were damaged by fire started by phosphorous incendiary devices, as was a British-owned theater. Members of the spy ring were caught, and they confessed. They had been planted by Modin, the Israeli military intelligence organization. The purpose was to sabotage Egyptian relations with the U.S. and Britain. For details of the Lavon affair, see Caffery to Duller, 4 Aug. 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 9:1599; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, pp. 209-16; and Heikal, Cairo Documents, pp. 43-44. 

(5) The "Bat Galim" ship was captured by the Egyptian navy on September 30, 1954  at the southern entrance of the Suez Canal. Ten sailors were arrested. Subsequently  Egypt  released them on January 1, 1955  after the intervention of the UN Security council., For documentation on the Bat Galim issue, see Hart to Murphy, 7 Sept. 1954, RG 59, 774.5; Lodge to Duller, 12, 13 Oct., 29 Nov. 1954, and Dulles to Lodge, 13 Oct., 4 Nov. 1954, RG 59, 974.5301; Duller to Lodge, 20 Dec. 1954, RG 59, 674.84A; Aldrich to Dulles, 29 Oct. 1954, RG 59, 611.41; and FRUS, 1952-1954, 9:1660, 1663-67, 1672-74, 1700-1704, 1714-15, 1719, 173132, 1738-41. For British documentation, see FO 371/108505, file JE1261/22-211, esp. Allen to K. J. Simpson, 23 Feb. 1955, JE1261/24.

(6) Shuckburgh diary, 7 Mar. 1955, Descent to Suez, p. 252; and memorandum of conversation by Duller, 14 Feb. 1955, FR US, 1955-1957, 14:53-54. 
 




(1)  Dulles to State Department, 24 Feb. 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 14:70. See also Shuckburgh to Stevenson, 15 Feb. 1955, and Shuckburgh to Eden, 16 Feb. 1955, FO 371/115865, VR1076/22; record of discussion between Eden and Nasser, 20 Feb. 1955, FO 800, Eg/55/3; minutes of meeting, 2 Mar. 1955, CAB 128/28, CC 19/55/3; and Dulles to Lawson, FRUS, 1955-1957, 14:92-93. For details of the Gaza raid, see Byroade to Dulles, 1 Mar. 1955, Lawson to Dulles, 1 Mar. 1955, and editorial note, ibid., pp. 73-78.

(2) Byroade to Dulles, 6 Apr. 1955, FR US, 1955-1957, 14:144-45. See also Byroade to Dulles, 1 Mar. 1955, ibid., p. 80;  Baker, Egypt's Uncertain Revolution, pp. 35-37; and Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World, p. 12. . Byroade to Dulles, 16, 17, 20 May 1955, FR US, 1955-1957, 14:188-92; Flower, Napoleon to Nasser, pp. 195-96; and Nutting, Nasser, pp. 91-100, 105-6.   LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, pp. 174-84 /Khrushchev quoted p. 175/; and Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, pp. 7-14.

(3) Byroade to Dulles, 20 May, 9 June 1955, FR US, 1955-1957, 14:192, 234. See also J. W Hanes to Russell, 15 Feb. 1955, Russell to Dulles, 14 Feb. 1955, Russell to Hoover, 5 May 1955, Hoover to Dulles, 5 May 1955, and Roderic L. O'Connor to Dulles, 6 May 1955, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 3; and Byroade to Dulles, 3, 5 Apr., 5, 17 May 1955, MacArthur to Hoover, 7 Apr. 1955, and Dulles to Byroade, 3 May 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 14:129-33, 141, 146-47, 169, 178, 189-90.

(4). Memorandum by Harold Macmillan, 11 June 1955, CAB 129/71, CP(55)35; and Alpha statement, 19 Aug. 1955, and Dulles to Eisenhower, 1 Sept. 1955, Whitman File: Dulles-Herter Series, box 4.

(5)  Byroade to Dulles, 24 Mar., 10 May, 6 June, 24 Aug., 1 Sept. 1955, Lawson to Dulles, 25, 30 Mar., 5, 15 Apr., 12 June, 28 Aug. 1955, Dulles to Lawson, 20 May 1955, Cole to Dulles, 16, 23 July 1955, memorandum of conversation by Russell, 25 Aug. 1955, unsigned messages from the embassy in Egypt, 26 Aug. 1955, Henderson to Lawson, 27 Aug. 1955, Hoover to Dulles, 3 Sept. 1955, and editorial notes, FRUS, 1955-1957, 14:119-20, 125-26, 134-38, 157-58, 182-84, 191, 220-22, 240-41, 299--300, 318-19, 390-91, 397-99, 404, 406-7, 412-15, 437-38, 445-46, 448-49.

(6)  Byroade quoted in Powers to Radford, 18 Aug. 1955, RG 218, CJCS (Radford) 091 Egypt; Allen quoted in Copeland, Game of Nations, p. 156.

(7)  British minutes of meetings, 20 Sept. 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 14:487. See also Aldrich to Dulles, 4, 13, 30 Aug. 1954, RG 59, 874.00; memorandum by Harold Macmillan, 12 Oct. 1954, CAB 131/14, D(54)34; minutes of meetings, 27 Oct. 1954, 13, 28 July 1955, CAB 131/14 and 16, D(54), 6th meeting, minute 1, DC(55), 6th meeting, minute 3, and DC(55), 7th meeting, minute 6; and memorandum of conversation by Kirkpatrick, 18 May 1955, and minute by Eden, 8 July 1955, FO 371/113608, JE1057/4.

(8)  Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail, pp. 71-85; and Copeland, Game of Nations, pp. 152r69.

(9) But the time had come to give the world a sensation, so he decided to take the final step. First, he gave the American Ambassador one last chance. Calling him personally by telephone, he said, "Either you get action on my request for arms from Washington or I am going to sign a contract with the Russians." A few days later, just so no one could say there had not been adequate warning, Sabri told reporters, "If in the course of the coming week the Americans do not agree to give us what we are asking for yet again, we shall have to buy armaments from the Communist countries." The contract was actually signed secretly on Saturday, September 24, 1955. On Monday, Nasser made a telephone call to the American Ambassador and told him what he had done. Later that day, the British Ambassador asked if he could see the Prime Minister, urgently. When he arrived, somewhat distraught, he said he had been told the news by the Americans. "Is it really true?" he asked. "We have made a purely commercial agreement," Nasser replied. On Tuesday, he made the public announcement at the military exhibition. Washington reacted quickly. George V. Allen, Deputy Secretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs, was put on the first available plane for Cairo. When this news was published, Cairo chortled with pleasure. One Egyptian newspaperman said, "In the old days we had to crawl on our bellies to Washington. Now Washington crawls on its belly to us." While Allen was on his way, Washington listed what it had heard would be in the Czech shipment: two or three hundred MIG-15 jet fighters, twenty-five medium bombers, one to two hundred Stalin tanks, six submarines, and shipload after shipload of smaller materiel. When Allen arrived he was taken at once to the American Embassy for a briefing. An audience with Nasser was arranged for the next morning. Allen, accompanied by the American Ambassador, arrived a little before the appointed time. They waited half an hour and then asked if the Prime Minister had been told they were there. He had been. They waited an hour and asked a secretary if some error had been made. No error had been made. "The Prime Minister is aware that you are here," he said.It was an hour and a half before they were admitted. Several different accounts were later given to reporters to explain the delay. The Embassy said the Prime Minister had been waiting for clarification from his own representative at the United Nations in New York of some point involved in the controversy. Allen later explained that his trip was not about the Czech arms shipments at all. Others said the delayed appointment had been due to "a misunderstanding." Four years afterward the Egyptian official who had handled the situation for the Prime Minister declared, "This is one subject on which we and we alone are competent to comment, for no one else in the world knows why we did something except we ourselves. We kept Mr. Allen waiting because we had heard he was bringing from Washington an indignant letter and that he intended to bang the table and give us a lecture. We kept him waiting to cool him off. We kept him waiting until he agreed not to present the note he had been sent to deliver." Whatever the reason, the result was that the personal representative of the President of the United States was held up to embarrassment in the eyes of the world. Egypt had waited many centuries to humiliate so powerful a nation publicly. The Czech contract was signed now, and she could be supremely and even arrogantly independent, if she pleased. The Allen trip convinced Nasser, his advisers, and the Arab public that the West was panicky. This caused delight in a large part of the Middle East. Nasser was the hero of the Arab world now. People were paying hardearned money for copies of his picture in the shops of Amman, Beirut, Damascus, even Baghdad. This almost universal Arab reaction demonstrated the hunger of these people for what Nasser kept calling "dignity." Excerpts from Robert St. John , The Boss, The Story of Gamal Abdel Nasser, pp 209-210.

(10)  Macmillan to Eden, 22 Sept. 1955, FO 800/669, Eg/55/7; Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, p. 637. 

(11)  Shuckburgh diary, 26, 27 Sept. 1955, Descent to Suez, p. 281; Macmillan quoted in Home, Macmillan, p. 368; memorandum of conversation by Wilkins, 3 Oct. 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 14:542r-49; Macmillan to Trevelyan, 4 Oct. 1955, and Macmillan to Makins, 4 Oct. 1955, FO 800/669, Eg/55/17, 30, and 31; minutes of meeting, 20 Oct. 1955, CAB 128/29, CM 36(55)1; State Department report, 14 Nov. 1955, IR 7074, RG 59; and Dulles to Eisenhower, [Oct. 1955], Whitman File: Dulles-Herter Series, box 4. See also Trevelyan to Macmillan, 26 Sept. 1955, FO 371/113608, JE1057/11; memorandum of conversation by Dulles, 28 Sept. 1955, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversation Series, box 4; Eden to Macmillan, 27, 28, 30 Sept. 1955, and Macmillan to Eden, 3 Oct. 1955, FO 800/669, Eg/55/10-16 and 25; Eisenhower to Bulganin, 11, 24 Oct. 1955, Whitman File: Dulles-Herter Series, box 4; and Trevelyan to Eden, 13 Oct. 1955, and Eden to Trevelyan, 27 Oct. 1955, PREM 11/859.

(1)  Hoover to Humphrey, 14 Dec. 1955, WHCF-DDE (Confidential), box 70; Hoover testimony, 17 Jan. 1956, U.S. Congress, Senate, Executive Sessions, p. 45; Dulles quoted in Finer, Dulles over Suez, p. 38; minutes of meeting, 3 Nov. 1955, CAB 128/28, CM 39(55)5; Eden to Eisenhower, 26 Nov. 1955, PREM 11/1177; and memorandum of conversation by Russell, 26 Oct. 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 14:655. See also minutes of meetings, 20 Oct., 22 Nov. 1955, CAB 128/28, CM 36(55)1 and CM 42(55)9; Macmillan to Foreign Office, 26 Oct. 1955, FO 371/113641, JE1072/1; Allen Dulles to Foster Dulles, 29 Oct. 1955, and minutes of NSC meeting, 1 Dec. 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 14:679-80, 812-17; progress report on NSC 5428, 2 Nov. 1955, RG 273; Hoover to Dulles, 28 Nov. 1955, and memorandum of conversation, 29 Nov. 1955, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, box 11; Sherman Kent to Allen Dulles with attachment, 29 Nov. 1955, Allen Dulles Papers, box 67; memorandum of conversation, 9 Dec. 1955, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 3; Hoover to Dulles, [ca. 18 Dec. 1955], WHCF-DDE (Confidential), box 70; and interview with Winthrop Aldrich, DOHC.

(2)  Hoover to Byroade, 16 Dec. 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 14:868-70. See also memorandum of conversation by Gay, 23 Sept. 1954, RG 59, 874.00; Perry Ellis to Dulles, 20 Oct. 1954, FR US, 1952-1954, 9:2308-12; memorandum of conversation by Allen, 16 Nov. 1955, editorial note, memorandum of conversation by Hoover, 12 Dec. 1955, and Hoover to Byroade, 15 Dec. 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 14:777-80, 837-38, 849-51, 860-65; Hoover to Dulles, [ca. 18 Dec. 1955], WHCFDDE (Confidential), box 70; Foreign Office brief, 29 Dec. 1955, FO 371/119047, JE 1422/8; memorandum of conversation, 23 Jan. 1956, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, box 5; progress report on NSC 5428, 17 May 1956, RG 273; interviews with Black and with Humphrey and Hoover, DOHC; and Mason and Asher, World Bank, pp. 632-37.

(3) Memorandum of conversation by Bergus, 11 Oct. 1955, FR US, 1955-1957, 14:572; Ben-Gurion quoted in Dulles to Eisenhower, 18 Nov. 1955, WHCF-DDE (Confidential), box .70; and minutes of meeting, 8 Nov. 1955, CAB 131/16, DC(55), 14th meeting, minute 2. See also Dulles to State Department, 26, 31 Oct. 1955, memorandum of conversation by Allen, 16 Nov. 1955, Lawson to Dulles, 17 Nov. 1955, Dulles to Byroade, 10 Dec. 1955, and Sharett to Dulles, 12 Dec. 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 14:657-59, 683-84, 773-76, 784-86, 841-48; Goodpaster to Adams, 31 Oct. 1955, and memorandum of conversation, 9 Nov. 1955, Whitman File: Dulles-Herter Series, boxes 4 and 5; memorandum by Jacob K. Javits, 18 Nov. 1955, WHCF-DDE (Confidential), box 70; minutes of meeting, 2 Dec. 1955, CAB 131/16, DC(55), 16th meeting, minute 4; memoranda of conversation by Dulles, 9 Dec. 1955, 11 Jan. 1956, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, boxes 3 and 4; and minutes of meeting, 3 Jan. 1956, CAB 128/30, CM 1/50/3.

(4). Eisenhower diary entry, 11 Jan. 1956, Whitman File: Diary Series, box 9; Anderson quoted in Ewald, Eisenhower, p. 194. See also Dulles to Aldrich, 7 Dec. 1955, memorandum of conversation by Russell, 30 Dec. 1955, Dulles to Lawson, 6 Jan. 1956, and Anderson to Dulles, 27 Jan. 1956, FR US, 1955-1957, 14:836, 890-92, 15:15, 80-82; and memorandum of conversation by Dulles, 11 Jan. 1956, Dunes Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 4. The undercover officer(s) in Cairo filed voluminous reports of meetings with Nasser. See FRUS, 19551957, 15:56-58, 60-63, 119-20, 127-29, 138-40, 147-48, 152-58, 173-74, 19596, 198-207, 209, 262-63, 273-75. For a message from DO Allen Dulles to the undercover officer/s/, see ibid., pp. 92-94. For evidence of clandestine contacts in Tel Aviv, see ibid., pp. 170, 396-97.

(5) . Aide-memoire from the Israeli embassy, 6 Dec. 1955, and unsigned message to Anderson, 4 Feb. 1956, FR US, 1955-1957, 14:824, 15:138-40; Nasser quoted in Heikal, Cairo Documents, pp. 55-57; and Russell to Dulles, 20 Feb. 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, 15:189-93. See also Sharett to Dulles, 12 Dec. 1955, Anderson to Dulles, 24 Jan. 1956, unsigned message to Washington, 24 Jan. 1956, Russell to Dulles, 5 Feb. 1956, ibid., 14:845-46, 15:58-66, 143-45; and memorandum of conversation by Dulles, 11 Jan. 1956, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 4.

(6) Sharett to Dulles, 12 Dec. 1955, unsigned message to Anderson, 4 Feb. 1956, Russell to Dulles, 5 Feb. 1956, FR US, 1955-1957, 14:847, 15:139-40, 144; and memoranda of conversation by Hoover, 5, 12 Mar. 1956, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 4.

(7)  Anderson to Dulles, 21, 22, 25 Jan. 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, 15:43, 47-50, 68-70. See also Anderson to Dulles, 23, 29 Jan., 3 Feb., 6 Mar. 1956, Lawson to Dulles, 25 Jan. 1956, Dulles to Anderson, 26, 28 Jan. 1956, Byroade to Dulles, 21, 22 Feb. 1956, ibid., pp. 54-56, 72, 77-79, 91-92, 94-95, 133-35, 196-98, 207-9, 302-7; Nasser to Eisenhower, 6 Feb. 1956, and Eisenhower to Nasser, 27 Feb. 1956, Whitman File: International Series, box 8; memorandum of conversation by Hoover, 16 Mar. 1956, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 4; and memorandum of conversation, 4 Apr. 1956, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversation Series, box 4.

(8). Eisenhower diary entry, 13 Mar. 1956, Whitman File: Diary Series, box 9. See also Anderson to Dulles, G Mar. 1956, Anderson to Hoover, 7 Mar. 1956, memorandum of conversation by Russell, 15 Mar. 1956, unsigned message to Washington, 21 Mar. 1956, and Russell to Dulles, 5 June 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, 15:302-7, 310-14, 320-22, 367-70, 392-94, 707-14.

(9) Dulles quoted in notes by Minnich, 2 Mar. 1956, Minnich Papers, Cabinet Series, box 4; press statement by James C. Hagerty, 9 Apr. 1956, Dulles Papers,box 106; Eisenhower to Nasser, [early Apr. 1956], Whitman File: International Series, box 8; and memorandum of conversation by Dulles, 6 Apr. 1956, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 4. See also memorandum of conversation by Goodpaster, 2 Feb. 1956, Whitman File: Diary Series, box 12; memorandum of conversation, 7 Feb. 1956, and Byroade to Dulles, 10 Apr. 1956, Whitman File: International Series, boxes 8 and 20; minutes of meeting, 28 Feb. 1956, CAB 128/30, CM 17(56)3; Eden to Eisenhower, 18 Mar. 1956, PREM 11/1177; memorandum of conversation by Dulles, 26 Apr., 1, 24 May, 13 July 1956, and Hanes to MacArthur, 1 May 1956, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 4; Makins to Lloyd, 9 Apr. 1956, FO 800/723; and progress report on NSC 5428, 17 May 1956, RG 273. For details on border clashes and unsuccessful United Nations truce talks, see FR US, 1955-1957, 15:478-80, 488-96, 498-504, 524-27, 544-47, 561-63, 591-92, 602-3.

(10) . Dulles quoted in progress report on NSC 5428, 2 Nov. 1955, RG 273; and Dulles to Macmillan, 5 Dec. 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 14:820-21. See also Byroade to Dulles, 1 Mar. 1955, memorandum of conversation by Shuckburgh, 14 July 1955, British minutes of meeting, 20 Sept. 1955, memoranda of conversation by Russell, 26 Oct., 9 Nov. 1955, ibid., pp. 78-79, 294-97, 485-91, 653-54, 72023; telegram from army headquarters, [Aug. 1955], and Radford to Twining, 25 Oct. 1955, RG 218, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47/, sections 22 and 23; Trevelyan to Macmillan, 3 Nov. 1955, PREM 11/859; and minutes of meetings, 7, 30 Mar. 1955, 9 Feb. 1956, CAB 128/28 and 30, CC 21/55/1, CC 27(55/2, and CM 10/56/1.

(11)  Minute by Eden, 3 Nov. 1955, PREM 11/859; Anderson to Dulles, 19 Jan. 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, 15:31; Dulles testimony, G Jan. 1956, U.S. Congress, Senate, Executive Sessions, pp. 10-11; and Macmillan quoted in Home, Macmillan, pp. 387-88. See also memorandum by Paul D. Harkins, 16 Dec. 1955, RG 319, OPD 091 Jordan; Eisenhower diary entry, 10 Jan. 1956, Whitman File: Diary Series, box 9; memorandum of conversation by Dulles, 11 Jan. 1956, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 4; unsigned memorandum of conversation, 7 Feb. 1956, Whitman File: International Series, box 20; and Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World, pp. 13-14.

(12) . Progress report on NSC 5428, 17 May 1956, RG 273; and minutes of meeting, 28 Feb. 1956, CAB 128/30, CM 17/56/4. See also Radford to Wilson, [Feb. 1956], RG 218, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47), section 26; Eisenhower to Eden, 5 Apr. 1956, Whitman File: International Series, box 19; memorandum of conversation by Goodpaster, 16 Mar. 1956, and memoranda of conversation, 7, 10 Apr. 1956, Whitman File: Diary Series, boxes 13 and 15; and Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 77.

(13)   Unsigned memorandum of conversation, 30 Jan. 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, 15:107; Eden to Eisenhower, 5 Mar. 1956, PREM 11/1177; minutes of meeting, 6 Mar. 1956, CAB 128/30, CM 19(56)1; and Lloyd to Eden, 13 Mar. 1956, PREM 11/1476. See also minute by Watson, 22 Feb. 1956, FO 371/119303, JE 1682/1;Lloyd to Eden, 4 Mar. 1956, PREM 11/1476; record of conversation, 12 Mar. 1956, I, FO 371/118861, JE 1053/9; Eden, Full Circle, pp. 388-90; Lloyd, Suez, pp. 44-51; and Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 90-93.

(14)  Memorandum of conversation, [30 Jan. 1956], Whitman File: International Series, box 20; Hoover to Dulles, 16 Mar. 1956, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 4; Eisenhower to Eden, [ca. 8 Mar. 1956), Whitman File: Dulles-Herter Series, box 5; and Eisenhower diary entry, 8 Mar. 1956, Whitman File: Diary Series, box 9. See also Dulles to Hoover, 8 Mar. 1956, Whitman File: Dulles-Herter Series, box 5; Eisenhower diary entry, 28 Mar. 1956, Whitman File: Diary Series, box 9; and memorandum of conversation by Dulles, 6 Apr. 1956, and Hanes to William Rountree, 10 May 1956, Dulles Papers, White House B  Memoranda Series, box 4.

 (15) . Lloyd to Trevelyan, 25 Mar. 1956, FO 371/118861, JE 1053/13. See also minutes of meeting, 21 Mar. 1956, CAB 128/30, CM 24(56)5.

 (16)  Eisenhower diary entry, 13 Mar. 1956, Whitman File: Diary Series, box 9; , memorandum by Wilkins, 14 Mar. 1956, FR US, 1955-1957, 15:352-57; and Dul les to Eisenhower, 28 Mar. 1956, Whitman File: Diary Series, box 13. See also  memoranda of conversation by Wilson, 15, 21 Mar. 1956, Makins to Dulles, 21 Mar., 5 Apr. 1957, memoranda of conversation by MacArthur, 1, 4 Apr. 1956, Dunes to Byroade, 3 Apr. 1956, and editorial note, FR US, 1955-1957, 15:366, 383-87, 389-92, 435-45, 453-55, 457-62, 467-70; Eden to Eisenhower, 19 Mar. 1956, and Eisenhower to Eden, 20 Mar. 1956, PREM 11/1177; and memorandum of conversation by Goodpaster, 29 Mar. 1956, Whitman File: Diary Series, box 13.

 (17)  Unsigned memorandum of conversation, 26 Sept. 1955, FR US, 1955-1957, I 14:518; Foreign Office brief, 7 Jan. 1956, FO 371/118861, JE 1053/1; Shuckburgh diary, 1, 3, 12, 13 Mar. 1956, Descent to Suez, pp. 339-41, 346; Eden quoted in  Nutting, No End of a Lesson, p. 34; and Nutting quoted in Lapping. End of Empire, p. 262.
 
 

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