CHAPTER ONE: THE LOST WAR
EPISODE THREE
The
Egyptian Army had been trained and commanded by Britons for two generations.
Until 1936, when the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of friendship and alliance
was signed, the Army's British mentors had opposed every effort to make
it an effective fighting force for fear that it might someday be used against
them. Since 1936, to be sure, they had improved the quality of its
training and equipment, but not to such an extent that it could be used
effectively against the Zionists in Palestine.
It
had long been my hope to imbue the Army with a new spirit, and I now proceeded
to do so with a double purpose-first, to confound the King and his
cronies, and, second, to confound the British. I was ashamed of the
low esteem in which Egyptians were held by Britons and other foreigners,
and I was determined to show our cynical rulers that something could and
would be done about it. I therefore became a "soldier's general"
I rnade it absolutely clear to my men that I would ask them to do nothing
that I was not prepared to do myself. I shared their food and slept in
the open with them to show what I expected in the way of soldierly behaviour.
I punished the liars and the slovens and rewarded those who told the truth
and kept their minds and bodies clean. I think I can say without boasting
that the troops under my command fought better than any of the others.
My men trusted me and I trusted them, which was as it should have been
but seldom was, in an army trained to serve British rather than Egyptian
interests.
We
entered the war with so little preparation that there was no time to carry
out a general mobilization. I had to hire twenty-one trucks from Palestinian
Arabs in order to haul my troops from Rafah up to Ghazah,
and I had to leave some of my six-pounders behind for lack of tractors.
The terrain was too difficult to haul them behind our trucks. The officer
in charge of the abandoned six-pounders cried for shame, and there were
tears in my own eyes as well.
Between
May
and December I took part in twenty one engagements. On each occasion
I led my men into battle even though it was no part of my responsibility
as a senior officer to do so. I wanted my subordinates to follow my example.
Demoralization spreads from the top, not the bottom, of any organization.
Hopeless though our predicament was, I was determined that it would be
through no fault of mine that we should be defeated.
One
reason why the Turks were victorious in Gallipoli, and why they
were later able, after their crushing defeat; to repel the Greek
invasion, was that Mustafa Kamal Ataturk and
his fellow officers did the same. Kamal, who was never wounded
in spite of all the risks he took, acquired the reputation of being invulnerable
to bullets. In the beginning I, too, enjoyed the same sort of reputation.
So many officers were killed at my side that I came to be known as "Bulletproof"
Nagiyb. Many of my Sudanese troops believed that I cared an amulet
around my neck; it was supposed to contain special verses from the Qur'an
that protected me from death. But the law of averages soon took effect.
Counting a grazed finger, I was wounded four times in seven months-the
last time so seriously that I almost died. But, though I was no longer
known as "Bulletproof," the mere fact that I survived was attributed
by many of thy men to the baraka that I was supposed to possess a special
blessing that had spared me for the accomplishment of some divine purpose.
Although I don't really believe in my barakah, I have found
it expedient to behave as if I did, as I think everyone in my position,
to be successful, must. And who can say that the revolution I was
chosen to lead was not really, a "blessed movement," as the people
called it? Who knows but what God in His wisdom decided that the time had
come for the children of the Nile, the Egyptians and the Sudanese, to take
their destiny into their own hands at last?
In
June, at Isduwd, just south of Tel Aviv, my forces won the
largest battle in which Egyptians were engaged Palestine. After
three days of fighting we counted 450 enemy dead-more than a tenth
of the 4,000 Zionists who had opposed us. My own forces numbered
2,300
and our casualties were relatively light.
A,
week later, after the Battle of Nitzarim, Mawawiy
cited me for bravery and recommended that I be either exceptionally promoted
to the rank of major general or awarded the King Fuw'ad
Star, which was
Egypt's highest military decoration. A mine
had exploded two paces in front of me, and I had received a number of superficial
wounds in my chest and right loin. I kept my wounds a secret from Mawawiy
for fear that he would use them as an excuse for sending me back to Cairo.
I handed over the 2nd Infantry Brigade to its original commander, BrigadierMahmuwd
Fahmiy Ni`mat Allah, who had just, arrived from Cairo, and returned
to Ghazah to undergo secret treatment. Two weeks later I
was strong enough to resume my duties. In the meantime I had relieved
Major General Muhammed Fawziy, who had fallen ill, as the commander
of the 4th Infantry Brigade. Eventually I was placed in command
of the sector running from Bethlehem to Faluwgah to al-Magdal
on
the Mediterranean.
In
July
1948, just before the second truce, my forces were badly defeated in
the Battle of Naqbah.
Mawawiy had rejected my own
plan of action in favour of one of his own, which was so faulty, in my
opinion, that I refused to carry it out. He relieved me of my command,
but, as soon as he realized that we were going to be defeated, he asked
me to command our withdrawal, which I carried out in the midst of a series
of unopposed enemy air attacks.
A
few days Iater I appealed to Mawawiy for reinforcements
to make up for the heavy casualties that we had suffered. He refused to
believe that our losses had been as great as I said they were and accused
me of trying to blame him unjustly for our defeat. In front of several
staff officers he berated me in terms that I could not accept, and so I
demanded that he apologize. When he refused to do so I told him what I
thought of him in terms as strong as those he had used in describing me.
I then returned to my headquarters and drew up a written report of what
had happened. I submitted it to Mawawiy with the request
that he apologize in writing. Instead he ordered me to report to GHQ
in
Cairo
and I recommended that I be tried for insubordination. His recommendation
was never acted upon, however, because of its inconsistency with his previous
recommendation that I be either exceptionally promoted or decorated with
the Fuw'ad Star.
(To be continued)
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