But first we had to settle a more fundamental question :what sort of battle? July 6-7, 1971: I was visiting naval units and bases in Alexandria, accompanied by several members of the Armed Forces Supreme Council. The full Armed Forces Supreme Council was to meet in Cairo on July 8, so I judged it convenient for those of us in Alexandria to have a preliminary session. On July 7 we met in the Alexandria naval college. I outlined my views on our realistic offensive options in the light of the limitations imposed on us by our weakness in the air. A good number of those present seemed convinced.
 

July 8: The full Armed Forces Supreme Council meeting. War Minister  Sadiq in the chair. The first clash between  Sadiq and myself over our ideas for Egypt's offensive. Our rival views I have outlined in Chapter Two. General  Sadiq's thinking, as he argued it at the meeting, was: "Let us define the optimum possible goal, whether or not we have the means. Then let us concentrate on gaining the means to achieve that goal." I countered that this might befit a superpower, or a country with unlimited support and guarantees from a superpower. We had neither. We could not control the means. So we had to act within the means we could reasonably expect to have.

The military decision hinged upon a political judgment, in other words. What arms could we expect from the Soviets?

There was no vote at the meeting.  Sadiq decided that a modest offensive with the passes as our final target would be prepared and a listing of necessary weapons and equipment was to be calculated by those present This was actually the birth of Operation 41.  Sadiq and I continued our discussion, however, outside the council meeting until I was able to convince him to proceed with The High Minarets, somewhere on or about July 15. Which explains why the ultimate outcome of this and subsequent meetings was, as I described in Chapter Two (see Episodes Four: OPERATION 41 AND THE HIGH MINARETS), a secret compromise: Operation 41, the drive to cross the canal and seize the Sinai passes in a single operation, to be drawn up in collaboration with our Soviet advisers. Meanwhile The High Minarets, limited to holding a bridgehead across the canal to be planned in extreme secrecy and based upon our estimate of the very minimum equipment we could expect to have. As the planning of Operation 41 reached a crucial point, however, another aspect of superpower politics intruded.

 The first week of September: The Randopolo Affair. Our intelligence services had uncovered an American espionage ring. The principals were Tanashi Randopolo, an Egyptian of Greek parentage, and a Miss Swain Harris of the United States mission in Cairo.

Randopolo gave a complete confession, naming his sources among the Russians on Ganaklis air base outside Alexandria. His good friend Mr. Belekov had served there from May 1969 to March 1971 and then sent his replacement, Mr. "Victor" with a letter of introduction to Randopolo. Victor's assistant, Mr. "Yuri," had been equally close. Victor and Yuri had been to Randopolo's for dinner; Randopolo dined at the base so often he had the run of the Russian's private quarters. He had even been in the audience for a Soviet instructional film warning against spies. He had been all through the new concrete blast hangars, the first of their kind in the world. And he was quite au fait with base gossip: the fact that the Soviet radar there was not the best they had; what sorts of SAMs guarded which Soviet bases; the Soviet view of Egyptian capabilities. A useful spy.

September 6: With that buzzing about us, we had our conference to discuss the list of arms and equipment necessary to Operation 41 that GHQ had compiled, with the assistance of our Soviet advisers. Myself, Baghdadiy (Air Force); General Muhammad `Aliy Fahmiy (Air Defense); General MamduwH Tuhamiy (Chief of Operations); General `Umar Guwhar (Chief of Organization) the inner core of GHQ were present. We agreed on the formidable list and I delivered it toSadiq.

September 12: On the President's orders, I called in General Shvartz, Assistant Chief Soviet Adviser (General Okunev, Chief Soviet Adviser, was out of town), to relate what we had learned about Soviet security from the Tanashi Randopolo case. "What Randopolo told Harris will no doubt find its way to Israel," I said. "But to avoid damaging our friendship with the Soviet Union, the President has decided to close the case. We trust that, as friends, the Soviets will instruct their personnel to exercise more vigilance to avoid such entanglements in the future. We leave to you what action you take against the personnel already involved."

Shvartz promised immediate steps. Next day he told me all were to be sent home. As for Miss Swain Harris, the President ordered her release within days. Only Tanashi Randopolo was left to pay the full price.

September 21: General `Abd al-Qadir Hasan, Vice Minister of War, flew to Moscow for preliminary negotiations for an arms deal based upon the requirements of Operation 41 and valued at 130 million rubles, approximately $195 million. With Hasan, who was always the Egyptian representative in these negotiations with the Soviets, went our Chief of Organization, General `Umar Guwhar
 
 
 

October 8: The negotiations had gone well. General  Sadiq flew to Moscow to sign   the deal, returning on October 16.

October 17: A conference of senior commanders to discuss the deal. Sadiq in the
chair. The Soviet Union is to supply:

• 10 TU-16 bombers with air-to-surface Missiles (ASM) capable of hitting ground targets almost 95 miles away;

• 100 MIG-21FMs. 50 before the end of the year;

• 20 MIG-23s, to be supplied during 1972 with Soviet pilots until they can be replaced by Egyptians;

• One brigade of QUADRAT, the mobile SAM known in the West as SAM-6;

• One 180mm artillery battalion;

• One 240mm mortar battalion;
• Three PMP bridges.

• the D-30 120mm gun;

• the 23mm twin-barrel, anti-aircraft gun;

• the AKM automatic rifle; the RPG anti-tank rocket launcher;

• plus assistance with an enormous ammunition production program of our own: 23mm for the anti-aircraft gun; 82mm for the B-10 rocket launcher; 120mm mortar ammunition; 122mm for the M-30 gun; the same caliber for the D-30; 130mm for the M-46; 152mm for the howitzer; projectiles for the RPG; and RKG hand grenades.

Sadiq told us he had asked the Soviets to manufacture the MI-24 helicopter in Egypt too. The politicians turned down the request, but Grechko, told him privately he would reconsider the point later.

        November 4: The President called a conference of the inner circle of his military advisers: Sadiq, myself, Hasan (Vice Minister), Baghdadiy (Air Force), Fahmiy (Air Defense), Nasif (Presidential Guard), plus Okunev, (Chief Soviet Adviser.) The President had three announcements:
 

• ONE: He had held a meeting of the National Security Council the day before and ordered it to mobilize all the country's resources behind the forthcoming assault.

• TWO: He was immediately assuming the title of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

• THREE:On November 11 he was proposing to declare that he withdraw his February 4 peace initiative, in which he had offered to re-open the canal under certain conditions.

 "Mr. Bergus then said to me: We know you now have the new TU-16 capable of         launching supersonic missiles. That weapons system is designed principally against ships. The United States is therefore deeply concerned. We have no choice but to see the introduction of this weapon as a significant factor in the balance of power between us and the Soviet Union in the region.' "

"I told Bergus I am not about to declare war on the United States. But you must understand that strikes against the interior of Egypt will now be met by strikes against the interior of Israel. Instead of expressing concern, you should be ashamed of yourselves. You supply Israel with Phantoms with which they strike our heartland. But when I get a weapon to hit back, then and only then do you express concern. Why?"

The Air Force Commander, Baghdaadiy, had at one point broken into the President's address to voice his fears that the TU-16 missiles were valueless. His chief technical adviser had apparently told him their maximum speed was only 750 miles per hour. In his view, anything slower than Mach two was of little use. General Okunev replied that Baghdadiy's information was wrong and gave the true performance figures. (I see no reason to reveal a friendly power's military secrets, so I omit them here.) Okunev added, however, that the problem lay in training. The TU-16 navigators needed 500 hours.

Now Baghdadiy raised another problem: "The 50 MIG-21 MFs we were promised [in October] during 1971 will need three months to be prepared for the battle, so we trust they will arrive as soon as possible. Nor is the workshop for their engine maintenance ready. We hope the Soviet Union will take immediate action to finish it." The President turned to the Soviet Ambassador: "I request your excellency to ask the Soviet leadership to send what we have agreed upon as soon as possible, and to let us know the expected dates of arrival. I would also like work on the aircraft factory and the maintenance workshop accelerated."

Our relationship with the Soviet Union had never seemed more fruitful. The October deal would give us the arms we needed. The Soviet representatives in Egypt were clearly anxious to smooth any problems. Feeling confident, I left the conference to accompany the President on a tour of the troops the special forces and units of the Second Army that same day; then, after a night in al-‘Isma`iyliyah, we drove on to see units of the Third Army, returning to Cairo on November 20.

It was time to look to our other allies, the Arab states around us. From November 21-26, I met the Chiefs of Staff of all the Arab armed forces, to prepare the ground for my first meeting with the Arab Collective Defense Council at the end of November. What I did not anticipate was  that this Arab Collective Defense Council meeting, besides being crucial in our search for reinforcements, would mark also the opening of the rift between General Sadiq and myself.